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ABSTRACT
Essay 1: An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical
Takeovers
Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal Capital
Markets
by
Jaideep Shenoy
03/25/2009
Committee Chair: Dr. Omesh Kini
Major Department: Finance

Essay 1: An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical
Takeovers
We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical integration using
a large sample of vertical takeovers. The efficiency rationale posits that vertical integration
prevents future holdup between non-integrated suppliers and customers. In contrast, the
foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration harms competition. To
distinguish between these hypotheses, we examine the wealth effects of the merging firms,
acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers on announcement of vertical takeovers.
Our univariate and cross-sectional results suggest that firms alter their vertical boundaries in a
manner that is consistent with the efficiency rationale. Our tests do not find evidence supportive
of the anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration.

Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal Capital
Markets
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of vertical relatedness between business segments
of multi-segment firms and how vertical relatedness affects the internal allocation of capital.
Consistent with theory, we observe a higher degree of vertical relatedness between segments in
environments likely to involve contracting problems. Further, there is a greater tendency for
investments to flow towards segments with better investment opportunities as the degree of
vertical relatedness between business segments in the firm increases. This indicates that internal
capital markets function better in the presence of significant vertical relatedness between
segments. This finding supports the Stein (1997) model, which suggests that the headquarters is
able to do a better job of “winner-picking” when firms operate in related lines of businesses.
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An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical
Takeovers
1. Introduction
The decision to vertically integrate is of fundamental importance to firms. Vertical
integration provides common ownership over successive stages of production and facilitates
internal exchange instead of market or contractual exchange. Since the seminal work of Coase
(1937), the literature has developed several theories that explain what determines the vertical
boundaries of a firm.1 The efficiency rationale, as studied under the Transaction Cost Economics
and Property Rights theories, suggests that vertical integration reduces transaction costs by
mitigating contractual inefficiencies between non-integrated suppliers and customers and
provides incentives to make relationship-specific investments. These contractual inefficiencies
are also referred in the literature as “holdup” (Williamson (1971, 1979), Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990)).
In addition to the efficiency argument, the extant literature proposes two distinct anticompetitive rationales for vertical integration. The foreclosure argument suggests that a vertical
takeover with a supplier (customer) enhances the market power of the integrated firm since it can
deny access of the input (outlet) to its non-integrated rivals (Salinger (1988), Hart and Tirole
(1990), and Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990)). The collusion argument suggests that a vertical
takeover with a supplier (customer) enables better coordination between the integrated firm and
its non-integrated acquirer rivals since the rivals need access to the input (outlet) being controlled
by the integrated firm (Chen (2001) and Nocke and White (2007)).2
In this paper, we investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for
vertical integration in a sample of 453 successful vertical takeovers over the period 1981-2004.

1

Perry (1989), Joskow (2005), and Lafontaine and Slade (2007) provide extensive surveys of the literature on
vertical integration.
2
In contrast, in horizontal takeovers, collusion occurs due to a reduction in the number of producers in the takeover
industry.
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Our paper provides the first large sample study that attempts to disentangle the above three
rationales for vertical takeovers. To test the three hypotheses, we first examine the wealth effects
of the acquirer and target rivals on announcement of vertical takeovers. This is consistent with
the suggestion made in Eckbo (1983) that a test of collusion in vertical takeovers should examine
rivals in industries of both merging partners. We build upon this approach by also investigating
the announcement period wealth effects of corporate customers. These customers are identified
as firms that buy the output of the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. The analysis of
customer firms enhances our ability to differentiate the efficiency hypothesis from anticompetitive rationales and gives a more complete picture of the overall welfare effects of vertical
takeovers. Our research design also allows us to differentiate between foreclosure and collusion
– an issue that is potentially important from a merger policy standpoint but which the extant
literature has not addressed.
We distinguish between the three hypotheses by first developing and testing univariate
predictions on the announcement period wealth effects to the merging firms, rivals, and customer
firms, and then by investigating the cross-sectional determinants of these wealth effects. The
reduced transaction costs (under efficiency) or the increase in market power (under foreclosure
and collusion) both predict a positive combined wealth effect (CWE) for the merging firms in
vertical takeovers.3 Under the efficiency hypothesis, the announcement period wealth effect of
the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals is unrestricted in sign as there could be two
opposing forces at work here. The non-integrated rivals could implement similar vertical
acquisitions since the announcement disseminates information about possible efficiency gains
from vertical integration (better information view). On the other hand, they could be at a
competitive disadvantage since they might be subject to inefficiencies when compared to the

3

Vertical takeovers can be backward takeovers, where the acquirer is downstream and the target is upstream in the
supply chain, or forward takeovers, where the acquirer is upstream and the target is downstream in the supply chain.
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vertically integrated firm (competitive advantage view). Under the efficiency hypothesis, we
expect the customers to experience a zero or positive wealth effect based on how much of the
benefits due to reduced transaction costs are passed on to customers through lower prices.
Under the foreclosure hypothesis, the effect on both the non-integrated acquirer and
target rivals is negative on account of the increased market power of the vertically integrated
firm. Specifically, the vertically integrated firm can squeeze the margins of the non-integrated
rivals (both upstream and downstream) by foreclosing them from input supplies or from a
potential source of outlet. Under the collusion hypothesis, the effect on the non-integrated
acquirer rivals is positive, whereas the effect on the non-integrated target rivals is negative.
Specifically, the non-integrated acquirer rivals gain because of the increased coordination with
the vertically integrated firm since the acquirer rivals need access to the input (backward
takeovers) or a source of outlet (forward takeovers) controlled by the integrated firm. On the
other hand, the non-integrated target rivals lose since the ensuing collusion between the nonintegrated acquirer rivals and the integrated firm leads to a reduced demand for their output
(backward takeover) or higher input prices being charged to them (forward takeover). Finally,
under both the foreclosure and collusion hypotheses, we expect customer firms to experience a
negative wealth effect on account of the increased market power of the vertically integrated firm.
To identify vertical relations between acquirer and target firms, we use the dollar value of
commodity flows between different industries provided by the benchmark input-output accounts
of the U.S. economy (Fan and Lang (2000), Shahrur (2005), and Fan and Goyal (2006)). These
benchmark input-output accounts also help us identify customer industries for each vertical
takeover. In the spirit of Fan and Goyal (2006), we calculate the vertical relatedness coefficient,
which captures the extent of the commodity flow between the acquirer and target industries. Our
final sample of 453 successful vertical takeovers is based on a vertical relatedness coefficient of
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1% or greater.4 We find that vertical takeovers create value to the merging firms since they are
associated, on average, with a positive CWE to the merging firms. This finding is consistent with
the extant takeover literature (Fan and Goyal (2006)).
For the overall sample of vertical takeovers, we find that the acquirer rivals, target rivals,
and customers are associated with insignificant average abnormal returns. The insignificant
returns to the rivals and customers are weakly consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. To
further explore the hypotheses, we sub-divide our sample based on whether the takeover
generates a positive or negative CWE to the merging firms. We expect that the efficiency,
foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses would be more prominent in takeovers with a positive
CWE to the merging firms.5
In the sub-sample of takeovers with a positive CWE to the merging firms, we find that
the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals are associated with positive and significant abnormal
returns. This positive effect on acquirer and target rivals is consistent with the better information
view of the efficiency hypothesis and inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis. The positive
effect on the acquirer rivals is also consistent with the collusion hypothesis, but the positive
effect on target rivals is, however, inconsistent with this hypothesis. We also find that customer
firms that are most dependent on inputs from the downstream industry in the takeover experience
positive and significant abnormal returns. This positive effect on dependent customer firms is
inconsistent with the foreclosure and collusion rationales and consistent with the efficiency
hypothesis. Summing up, our univariate results in the positive CWE sub-sample are consistent
with the efficiency hypothesis and inconsistent with both the anti-competitive rationales.

4

In robustness tests, we also use higher cutoffs for the vertical relatedness coefficient to identify vertical takeovers.
This approach is consistent with the methodology in Shahrur (2005). The analysis based on the positive-negative
CWE split is only one piece of evidence we provide. We complement this with cross-sectional analyses which do
not rely on this split and where we include economic variables to capture each of our hypotheses.
5
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In the sub-sample of takeovers with a negative CWE to the merging firms, we expect that
motives such as agency problems in acquirers (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)),
overvaluation of acquirer‟s equity due to stock financing of the takeover (Travlos (1987)), or the
negative prospects facing the acquirer‟s industry causing it to diversify into the supplier or
customer industry (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)) are more dominant than the efficiency,
foreclosure, and collusion rationales. In this sub-sample, we find that acquirer rivals and
customer firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns, whereas target rivals
experience insignificant abnormal returns. The negative response of the acquirer rivals could
either be due to the takeover announcement providing new information that the acquirer industry
faces bad prospects or due to industry-wide overvaluation conveyed by the announcement of
stock financed takeovers. The negative response of customers indicates that value destroying
vertical takeovers have negative spillover effects on the customer industry also.
Next, we conduct cross-sectional analyses in an attempt to corroborate the implications of
our univariate findings. This analysis provides cleaner tests to distinguish between the efficiency,
foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses for the following reasons. First, we include the entire
sample of vertical takeovers and not rely on the split based on positive-negative CWE to the
merging firms. Second, by including economic variables related specifically to the efficiency,
foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses we are able to account for the view that these hypotheses
may not be mutually exclusive. We also include control variables for other motives that the
extant literature has shown to be causing a negative CWE for the merging firms.
First, we examine the determinants of the CWE to the merging firms. Under the
efficiency hypothesis, firms are wary of making relationship-specific investments (RSI) because
they foresee future holdup. If the vertical takeover was indeed motivated to solve future holdup,
we would expect a higher intensity of RSI post-merger. Based upon this notion, we posit that the
RSI of the integrated firm less the pre-merger asset-weighted RSI of the acquirer and target
- 12 -

captures the extent of the holdup problem. Prior studies have employed R&D intensity to
measure RSI (Levy (1985), Allen and Phillips (2000) and Kale and Shahrur (2007)). Based on
this literature, we use the industry-adjusted change in R&D intensity of the merging firms around
the year of takeover announcement as a proxy for the extent of the holdup problem. We find that
this proxy is positively related to the CWE of the merging firms suggesting that the gains from
vertical integration are higher when the extent of the future holdup problem is severe.
As a measure of potential foreclosure, we include the market share of the target (acquirer)
since the higher the market share of the target (acquirer), the greater is the ability of the
integrated firm to foreclose non-integrated acquirer (target) rivals. Similarly, we use the acquirer
industry concentration as a measure for potential collusion, since the higher the concentration in
acquirer industry, the higher is the likelihood of the integrated firm colluding with the nonintegrated acquirer rivals. Inconsistent with the anticompetitive rationales, we find that the
acquirer/target market share and acquirer industry concentration do not affect the CWE to the
merging firms.
We next examine the determinants of the wealth effects of the acquirer rivals, target
rivals, and customer firms. We find that the CWE of the merging firms is positively related to the
wealth effect of the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals. This is inconsistent with the
foreclosure hypothesis, where we expect a negative relation between the returns to the merging
firms and rivals. In addition, the CWE of the merging firms is positively related to the wealth
effect of the customer firms. This goes against the foreclosure and collusion hypotheses, where
we expect a negative relation between returns to the merging firms and customer firms. Further,
we find that acquirer industry concentration does not affect the wealth effect of the nonintegrated rivals and customer firms. This is inconsistent with the collusion hypothesis. Finally,
the acquirer and target market share affect the customer returns in a manner that contradicts the

- 13 -

predictions of foreclosure hypothesis. Overall, our cross-sectional analyses provide additional
evidence supporting the efficiency hypothesis.
Our study contributes to the extant literature in the following ways. First, we provide the
first comprehensive and large sample study that attempts to disentangle the efficiency,
foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical takeovers. Second, our univariate and crosssectional findings indicate that vertical takeovers are motivated by efficiency improvement rather
than anti-competitive rationales. Our findings build upon the work in Eckbo (1983) and
Rosengren and Meehan (1994) which does not find evidence supporting anti-competitive effects
in vertical takeovers challenged by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of
Justice (DOJ) prior to 1978. Our evidence also advances the industry-specific case studies which
find that vertical integration is efficiency enhancing (Mullin and Mullin (1997), Chipty (2001),
and Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007)). Third, in the 1990‟s the FTC and DOJ have shown
substantial interest in vertical takeovers on the grounds of foreclosure or collusion motives
leading to several challenges (Morse (1998) and Warren-Boulton (2002)). In this regard, our
analysis of rivals and, in particular, the customer firms may be of interest to the regulators since
it provides information on the welfare effects of a large sample of vertical takeovers. Finally, our
paper complements similar studies that investigate the sources of gains in horizontal takeovers
(Eckbo (1983, 1990, 1992), Fee and Thomas (2004), and Shahrur (2005)).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the literature
and develop our univariate predictions. In Section 3, we describe our data and empirical
methodology for univariate predictions and also present the univariate results. In Section 4, we
present our cross-sectional predictions and results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. Univariate Predictions
Vertical takeovers can be of two main types: (i) backward takeovers, where the acquirer
is downstream and the target is upstream in the supply chain, and (ii) forward takeovers, where
- 14 -

the acquirer is upstream and the target is downstream in the supply chain. Corporate customers
are identified as firms that buy the output of the downstream industry in the vertical takeover
(see Figure 1 for a schematic diagram). We disentangle the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion
rationales by first developing univariate predictions on the signs of the abnormal returns to the
merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers on announcement of
vertical takeovers. Our predictions are identical for both forward and backward takeovers. A
summary of our univariate predictions is presented in Table I.
2.1. Efficiency hypothesis
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Property Rights (PR) theories argue that
vertical integration reduces transaction costs that arise due to contractual inefficiencies between
customers and suppliers (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979),
Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990)). These theories posit that contracts are
incomplete and hence lead to situations where the contracting parties may take advantage of the
ambiguities in contracts and behave opportunistically in their own interests.6 Such opportunistic
behavior is termed as “holdup” and leads to sub-optimal relationship-specific investments (RSI).
Vertical integration provides common ownership, prevents future holdup behavior, and provides
flexibility to make RSI. Using the above arguments, we expect the merging firms in vertical
takeovers to experience a positive wealth effect since they improve productive efficiency by
undertaking optimal RSI.
Based on the extant literature, we use the better information and competitive advantage
views to explain the wealth effects of the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals (Eckbo (1983,
1990) and Rosengren and Meehan (1994)). Under the better information view, the vertical
takeover disseminates valuable information about possible efficiency gains from vertical

6

Whinston (2003) argues that the predictions of PR theory are different from those of TCE theory. Tests to
differentiate between the TCE and PR theories are beyond the scope of this paper.
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integration. The non-integrated acquirer and target rivals can also improve their efficiency by
undertaking vertical integration, and therefore experience a positive announcement period wealth
effect. In contrast, under the competitive advantage view, the non-integrated acquirer and target
rivals are at a competitive disadvantage compared to the integrated firm since they are still
subject to inefficiencies, and therefore experience a negative wealth effect. Overall, due to the
opposing effects of the above two views, we expect the sign of the announcement period wealth
effect of the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals to be unrestricted.
The wealth effect of the customer firms enhances our ability to separate the efficiency
hypothesis from the anti-competitive rationales. In each vertical takeover, we identify customers
as firms that buy the product of the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. If vertical
integration reduces transaction costs, then it is likely that at least some of these benefits would be
passed on to the customers through lower prices.7 We therefore expect the customer firms to
experience a zero to positive wealth effect based on how much benefits are passed on by the
integrated firm.
In prior research, Spiller (1985) investigates if asset specificity can explain gains to
merging firms in vertical mergers. Spiller argues that the smaller the distance between plants of
acquirer and target firms the larger would be the extent of asset specificity. He uses a sample of
32 vertical mergers challenged by FTC prior to 1978 and finds that the gains to the merging
firms are larger when the distance between plants is smaller. This is consistent with the
predictions of the Transaction Cost Economics theory. He does not investigate foreclosure and
collusion rationales for vertical integration.

7

Apart from the reduced transaction costs, the other benefits of vertical integration advanced in the literature are the
elimination of double marginalization (Perry (1989) and Joskow (2005)), a reduction in supply uncertainty (Arrow
(1975)), and better coordination in design (Perry (1989)).
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In summary, under the efficiency hypothesis, the combined wealth effect (CWE) of the
merging firms is positive, the wealth effect of the non-integrated acquirer/target rivals is
unrestricted in sign, and that of the customer firms is zero to positive (Table I).
2.2. Foreclosure Hypothesis
A large body of theoretical literature (post-Chicago school) shows that vertical takeovers
can harm competition by disadvantaging the upstream/downstream rivals (Salinger (1988), Hart
and Tirole (1990), Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), and Rey and Tirole (2006)). Under
foreclosure, a firm acquires an essential facility in either its supplier or customer industry and
finds it profitable to deny access of this facility to its non-integrated rivals. This leads to a
reduction in the margins of the rivals and increases the likelihood of their exit from the industry.
Further, foreclosure increases the barriers to entry since a likely entrant would require segments
in both upstream and downstream industries to compete effectively with the integrated firm.
Foreclosure can mainly be of two types: input foreclosure and customer foreclosure.
Input foreclosure occurs when a vertically integrated firm restricts supply of the input or raises
costs of the input that it controls to its non-integrated downstream rivals. Customer foreclosure
occurs when a vertically integrated firm reduces the revenues of the non-integrated upstream
rivals by not purchasing their output (Church (2004)).
Under the foreclosure hypothesis, we expect the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals
to experience a negative wealth effect due to the increased market power of the vertically
integrated firm. Specifically, in a backward takeover, the margins of the non-integrated acquirer
rivals are reduced due to the higher price of inputs from the integrated firm and the revenues of
the non-integrated target rivals decline since they can no longer sell their output to the integrated
firm. Similarly, in a forward takeover, the revenues of the non-integrated acquirer rivals decline
since they can no longer sell their output to the integrated firm and the margins of the nonintegrated target rivals are reduced due to the higher price of inputs from the integrated firm. The
- 17 -

increased barriers to entry and the unfair advantage over the non-integrated rivals enable the
vertically integrated firm to charge higher prices to customer firms. This suggests that customer
firms would experience a negative wealth effect.
The 1984 non-horizontal merger guidelines of the FTC and DOJ recognize foreclosure
effects of vertical takeovers.8 The U.S. antitrust regulators have scrutinized several vertical
takeovers on account of foreclosure, for example, the 1995 takeover of Wavefront Technologies,
a developer of graphics software, by Silicon Graphics (SGI), a manufacturer of graphics
workstations. FTC challenged this acquisition contending that it could lead to the foreclosure of
other workstation manufacturers by increasing the costs of obtaining graphics software from
Wavefront. Another concern was the foreclosure of the competitors of Wavefront due to the
increased costs in developing software for SGI workstations. FTC required that SGI maintain an
open architecture so that independent software developers could sell their product for use on SGI
computers (Morse (1998)).9
The extant literature provides industry-specific case studies and experimental studies that
investigate foreclosure. For example, Mullin and Mullin (1997) find that U.S. Steel‟s acquisition
of Northern Iron Ore properties promoted RSI and resulted in lower steel prices to the customers.
Chipty (2001) finds that customers of integrated cable operators are not worse-off when
compared to customers of non-integrated cable operators. Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) use
plant-level data on cement and ready-mixed concrete producers and find a reduction in prices
when plants became more integrated. The evidence in the above case studies is generally
inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis. In contrast, Hastings and Gilbert (2005) find that
mergers in the gasoline industry that increase the extent of vertical relatedness increased the

8

For an overview of the guidelines refer http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm. These guidelines also
recognize the possibility of collusion arising in vertical takeovers.
9
The takeover of Time Warner by AOL in 2000 was also challenged by the FTC on account of foreclosure
(Schlossberg (2004)).
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wholesale prices on account of increased cost to the rivals. Martin, Normann, and Snyder (2001)
and Normann (2007) provide experimental evidence consistent with foreclosure. Finally,
Rosengren and Meehan (1994) investigate foreclosure by studying the stock performance of
acquirer and target rivals on announcement of 19 vertical takeovers investigated by FTC between
1963 and 1982. They find that the rivals experience statistically insignificant abnormal returns
around the dates of announcement and challenge, which is inconsistent with foreclosure.10
Summing up, under the foreclosure hypothesis, the CWE to the merging firms is positive,
whereas the wealth effects of the non-integrated acquirer rivals, non-integrated target rivals, and
customer firms are negative (Table I).
2.3. Collusion Hypothesis
Several research studies have examined the possibility that horizontal takeovers create an
environment conducive to collusion amongst rival producers (Eckbo (1983, 1985), Fee and
Thomas (2004), and Shahrur (2005)). Horizontal takeovers reduce the number of producers in
the takeover industry and therefore increase the likelihood of collusion. There is less reason to
believe that vertical takeovers are associated with collusion since they do not alter the
upstream/downstream industry structures. However, there has been a substantial interest by the
FTC and DOJ regarding collusion due to vertical integration as evidenced in their non-horizontal
merger guidelines. In 1995, the FTC challenged the proposed takeover of PCS Health Systems, a
pharmacy benefits management company, by Eli Lilly, a drug manufacturer. Prior to the merger,
PCS‟ formulary included products of Eli Lilly‟s rivals. The FTC required a firewall to prevent
the passing of confidential information on the pricing structure of other drug manufacturers from
PCS to Lilly, which may have facilitated collusion between Lilly and its rivals (Morse (1998)). 11

10

Our study is a large sample study and over a different period from Rosengren and Meehan. Besides, we provide
tests to disentangle the hypotheses by studying the customer wealth effects and performing cross-sectional analyses.
11
Another example of antitrust intervention on grounds of collusion due to vertical integration is the challenge by
DOJ of the merger between AT&T Corporation and McCaw Cellular Communications in 1994 (Morse (1998)).
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Recent theoretical work adds further support to the view that vertical integration
increases the likelihood of collusion (Chen (2001) and Nocke and White (2007)). Chen (2001)
shows that backward takeovers increase the likelihood of downstream collusion. In his model,
the upstream and downstream industries are oligopolies with two firms at each level. Both
downstream firms bid to acquire the supplier with the lower marginal cost but only one of them
succeeds. Chen shows that the takeover creates incentives for the unsuccessful bidder to strike a
deal with the integrated firm for input supply. The integrated firm supplies input at a price above
its marginal cost but now has incentive to compete less aggressively in the downstream market
since its profits depend on the input sold to the rival. The ensuing collusion between the
integrated firm and the downstream rivals enables them to extract rents from customer firms.
Therefore, we posit that, in backward takeovers, the merging firms and the non-integrated
acquirer rivals would experience a positive wealth effect since there is a higher likelihood of
collusion after the vertical takeover. On account of this downstream collusion, the non-integrated
target rivals now have a reduced demand for their output and would experience a negative wealth
effect.12 Finally, the customer firms would experience a negative wealth effect since they face
higher input prices on account of collusion.
Nocke and White (2007) argue that forward takeovers increase the likelihood of upstream
collusion. Specifically, the vertical takeover of a downstream target by an upstream acquirer
facilitates collusion through the „outlets effect‟, where the non-integrated upstream rivals cannot
sell to the downstream segment of the integrated firm if they defect from collusive agreements,
or the „reactions effect‟, where the vertically integrated firm is better equipped to punish
defections of upstream rivals by competing more aggressively in the downstream market.

12

Since the acquirer initiates the acquisition it is likely that the intent is to collude at the acquirer‟s industry level.
Our predictions for the acquirer/target rivals under the collusion hypothesis are based on the assumption that
collusion occurs at the acquirer‟s industry level.
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Therefore, we posit that, in forward takeovers also, the merging firms and the nonintegrated acquirer rivals experience a positive wealth effect. On account of the upstream
collusion, the non-integrated target rivals experience a negative wealth effect since they receive
inputs at a higher price. The customer firms, who are buyers of the product of the downstream
industry in the vertical takeover, also experience a negative wealth effect if some of the harmful
effects of collusion experienced by the non-integrated target rivals are passed on to the next level
in the supply chain.
There is very little empirical evidence regarding the collusion rationale of vertical
takeovers. Eckbo (1983), who primarily investigates collusion in challenged horizontal
takeovers, also investigates the stock price response of the target rivals in challenged vertical
takeovers. He finds that target rivals experience largely insignificant abnormal returns both at the
announcement of proposal and the antitrust complaint. Consistent with the suggestion in Eckbo
(1983), we study rivals in the industries of both merging partners since the collusive effects can
be experienced at both the upstream and downstream levels. Further, our study is the first to
examine the effect of collusion on customers in vertical takeovers.
Summing up, under the collusion hypothesis, the CWE to the merging firms and the
wealth effect of the non-integrated acquirer rivals is positive, whereas the wealth effect of the
non-integrated target rivals and customer firms is negative (Table I).
3. Sample Selection and Univariate Results
3.1. Takeover sample
We use the Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions section of the Securities Data Company
(SDC) database between 1981 and 2004 to construct the takeover sample. We include deals
which meet the following characteristics in our sample: (i) the deal should not be classified as a
spin-off, repurchase, recapitalization, divestiture, leveraged buyout, or self-tender offer and (ii)
the „form‟ of the deal should not be classified as “Acquisition of remaining interest”,
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“Acquisition of assets” or “Buyback”. We define a contest for each target to include all bids for
that target such that the period between two consecutive bids is less than a year. Consistent with
Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003), successful bids are identified as those where the acquirer owned
less than 50% of the target shares prior to deal announcement and acquired at least 15% of the
target shares during the contest.13 We only include those contests where both the acquirer and
target are U.S. public firms. We also exclude contests where the acquirer or target is a financial
firm (four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999). For each
contest, we obtain the following dates: (i) the announcement date of the first bid in the contest,
(ii) announcement date of the first bid by the successful acquirer, and (iii) the announcement date
of the successful bid.
3.2. Identifying vertical takeovers
Kahle and Walkling (1996) find that firms change their industry classifications over time
and recommend using the historical SIC instead of the current SIC to identify the primary
industry classification of a firm. For each successful bid in our sample, we find the historical SIC
code (Compustat data item 324) for the acquirer and target during the year of takeover
announcement. Since Compustat provides the historical SIC code only beginning 1987, for
takeovers prior to 1987, we use the SIC code of the segment with the highest sales during the
announcement year.14 We exclude horizontal takeovers from our sample by dropping takeovers
where the acquirer and target have the same four-digit SIC code.
To identify vertical relations, we use the benchmark input-output accounts for the U.S.
economy published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis every five years. The Use Table from
the benchmark accounts provides a matrix of commodity flows between different pairs of input13

The choice of 15% target shares was originally proposed by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983). However, to account
for the possibility that our sample may be picking up stake purchases rather than acquisitions, we alternatively
define successful takeovers as those where the bidder acquires 100% of the target shares in the contest. The results
for this sample are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
14
For takeovers prior to 1987, if the SIC of the segment with the highest sales is missing, we use the 1987 historical
SIC.
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output (IO) industries. For example, for a given IO industry „i‟, we can obtain the dollar amount
of commodity flow from IO industry „j‟ required to produce the total output of industry „i‟. We
use the SIC-IO concordance table of Fan and Lang (2000) to map the four-digit SIC codes of the
acquirers and targets to their six-digit IO codes. We retain takeovers where both the acquirer and
target have same six-digit IO codes since prior research argues that significant opportunities for
vertical integration exist within IO industries (Fan and Goyal (2006)).
Since it is likely that input-output relations change over time, we use the 1982, 1987,
1992, and 1997 Use tables for takeovers taking place during the periods 1981 to 1985, 1986 to
1990, 1991 to 1997, and 1998 to 2004 respectively. The 1997 benchmark input-output accounts
incorporate the NAICS system instead of the SIC system of industry classification. Hence, for
takeovers during 1998 to 2004, we first map the four-digit SIC codes of acquirers and targets to
their six-digit NAICS codes using the Bridge tables provided by the Bureau of Census. We then
find their respective IO industries using the NAICS-IO concordance table provided in the 1997
benchmark input-output accounts.
As our measure for vertical relations, we calculate the vertical relatedness coefficient
(VRC) for each pair of acquirer-target IO codes. Our approach is in the spirit of Fan and Goyal
(2006). For every takeover, we calculate the VRCs as follows: (i) For every dollar of the acquirer
industry total output, find the dollar flow from the acquirer to the target industry (V1,AT) and the
dollar flow from the target to the acquirer industry (V1,TA), and (ii) For every dollar of the target
industry total output, find the dollar flow from the acquirer to the target industry (V2,AT) and the
dollar flow from the target to the acquirer industry (V2,TA). Then, the vertical coefficient under
the first approach is calculated as Max (V1,AT, V1,TA) and is called ACQVRC, whereas the VRC
under the second approach is calculated as Max (V2,AT, V2,TA) and is called TARVRC. We classify
a takeover as vertical if either ACQVRC or TARVRC is greater than 1%. Using both approaches
is important since if the acquirer (target) industry output is large compared to the target
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(acquirer) industry output, it is possible that a takeover would not meet the cutoff under the first
(second) approach.
Based on the above sample selection criteria, we identify 453 successful vertical
takeovers over the period 1981-2004.15 Table II presents the descriptive statistics for our sample.
About 67% of the vertical takeovers are structured as mergers and the remaining 33% as tender
offers. About 27% of the vertical takeovers in our sample are financed with equity only, 35% are
financed with cash only, and the remaining 38% are financed with a combination of cash and
equity. The market capitalization of the acquirers is significantly larger than the market
capitalization of the targets. Specifically, the mean (median) market capitalization of acquirer
firms is $15,659 million ($2,014 million) and that of target firms is $669 million ($129 million).
The mean value of V1,AT is 0.07, which indicates that seven cents worth of commodities
flow from the acquirer industry to the target industry for every dollar of output produced by the
acquirer industry. Similarly, the mean value of V1,TA is 0.08, which indicates that eight cents
worth of commodities flow from the target industry to the acquirer industry for every dollar of
output produced by the acquirer industry. The mean value of ACQVRC is 0.09, which indicates
that the extent of commodity transfer between the acquirer and target industries is nine cents for
every dollar of the acquirer industry total output. Similar numbers are obtained for V2,AT, V2,TA,
and TARVRC, which are based on target industry total output.
In Appendix A, we provide pairs of acquirer and target industries that display significant
vertical relationships based on V1,AT or V1,TA. Petroleum, chemicals, food, television and radio
broadcasting, motion pictures, and semiconductor manufacturing are some of the industries that
display significant vertical relationships. In unreported results, we find that acquirer and target
two-digit SIC industries such as business services (SIC=73), chemicals and allied products

15

Using higher cutoffs leads to a significant decrease in our sample size. Use of a 5% cutoff gives a sample of 225
vertical takeovers. The results for this sample are qualitatively similar to the sample based on the 1% cutoff.
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(SIC=28), communications (SIC=48), electronic and electrical equipment (SIC=36), and
industrial and commercial machinery (SIC=35) account for more than 50% of our takeover
sample. We also find significant vertical takeover activity during 1996-2000, which accounts for
roughly 36% of our sample (164 takeovers).
Since we identify our sample based on primary SIC codes, it is important that we
investigate how the sales of the primary segment compared to the overall sales of the acquirers
and targets in our sample. We find that the primary segment accounted for, on average, roughly
80% of the overall sales of acquirers and roughly 92% of the overall sales of targets. This
indicates that the primary segment accounted for a significant proportion of sales in both
acquirers and targets. Further, if horizontal relations exist between the acquirer and target firms
in the secondary segments, it is possible that our results are contaminated due to the inclusion of
takeovers with horizontal relations. To allay this concern, we use segment data of the acquirers
and targets and find 58 vertical takeovers that display horizontal relations at the secondary
segment level. Our results are robust to exclusion of these takeovers from our sample.
3.3. Event Study Methodology
We use the market model to calculate the parameter estimates of the return generating
process of the acquirer and target. We use the daily returns for 240 trading days beginning 300
days before the announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer as the estimation period.
Further, we require a minimum of 200 daily return observations during estimation period. We
then calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirer and target over the windows of (5, +5) and (-10, +10) trading days around the period between the announcement of the first bid
by the successful acquirer and the announcement of the successful bid in the contest.
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Consistent with Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), we measure the combined wealth effect
(CWE) of the takeover as the value-weighted cumulative abnormal return to the acquirer
(ACAR) and target (TCAR). The weights are the market capitalizations of the acquirer and target
fifteen trading days prior to the announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer.
3.4. Acquirer rivals, target rivals and corporate customers
We identify non-integrated acquirer rivals as all firms on Compustat with the same
primary SIC code as the acquirer provided they did not have a segment in the target‟s primary
SIC code. Similarly, we identify non-integrated target rivals as all firms on Compustat with the
same primary SIC code as the target provided they did not have a segment in the acquirer‟s
primary SIC code. Multi-segment firms that may have segments unrelated to the primary SIC
codes of the merging firms may create noise in the measurement of the abnormal returns. Hence,
as a robustness check, we construct the acquirer and target rival portfolios using single segment
firms alone. We find qualitatively similar results under this approach.
We identify the customer firms for each vertical takeover as follows. First, we identify
the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. Specifically, if the takeover is backward, the
downstream industry in the vertical takeover is the acquirer‟s input-output (IO) industry; and if
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the takeover is forward, the downstream industry in the vertical takeover is the target‟s IO
industry. Second, we find the industry that buys the highest proportion of the total output
produced by the downstream industry in the vertical takeover (Main Customer Industry), and the
industry that obtains the highest proportion of its inputs from the downstream industry in the
vertical takeover for production of its total output (Dependent Customer Industry). Further, to
account for low input-output relationships between the downstream industry in the vertical
takeover and the main/dependent customer industry, we consider the main/dependent customer
industry only if the proportion (as identified above) is at least 1%. Finally, we identify single
segment firms on Compustat that belong to the main and dependent customer industries during
the year of takeover announcement. We consider only single-segment firms for customer
portfolios because each six-digit customer IO industry typically includes multiple four-digit SIC
codes, and including multi-segment firms also would create a noisy proxy for customer returns.
For every vertical takeover, we combine the acquirer rivals, target rivals, main and
dependent customers into separate equally weighted portfolios to account for the
contemporaneous cross-correlation in returns. The equally weighted portfolio approach is
consistent with Eckbo (1983), Song and Walkling (2000), Fee and Thomas (2004), and Shahrur
(2005). We calculate the abnormal returns to the acquirer rival, target rival, main customer, and
dependent customer portfolios for windows of (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5) and (-10, +10) trading
days around the announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer.
3.5. Wealth effects of the merging firms, rivals, and customers
For the overall sample of 453 vertical takeovers, we find that the average acquirer
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is -1.11% and the average target CAR is 28.94% when
measured over the window of (-10, +10) trading days around the period between the
announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer to the announcement of the successful
bid in the contest. Over the (-5, +5) window, the average acquirer CAR is -0.83% and the
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average target CAR is 26.51%. For both the windows, the acquirer CAR is statistically
indistinguishable from zero, whereas the target CAR is statistically significant at the 1% level.
The average CWE to the acquirer and target firms is 2.21% and 2.13% over the (-10, +10) and (5, +5) windows and are both statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent
with Fan and Goyal (2006), who also find that vertical takeovers create value for the merging
firms.
In Panel A of Table III, we report the announcement period abnormal returns of the
acquirer rivals, target rivals, main customers, and dependent customers for our entire vertical
takeover sample. Consistent with the extant literature, we use the Patell Z-score to test the
statistical significance of abnormal returns (Eckbo (1983) and Song and Walkling (2000)). We
apply the Mikkelson and Partch (1988) correction to adjust for serial dependence. We perform a
generalized sign test for the statistical significance of the percentage of portfolios with positive
CARs. For the overall sample, we find that the average announcement period abnormal returns to
the acquirer rivals, target rivals, main customers, and dependent customers are statistically
insignificant for most of the windows. The insignificant performance of the acquirer/target rivals
is weakly consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, where we expected an unrestricted wealth
effect. Similarly, the insignificant performance of the customer firms indicates that none of the
efficiency gains due to vertical integration are passed on to the customers.
The efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses, all suggest that the takeover
created value for the acquirer and target firm. Hence, to improve the power of our tests, we subdivide our sample based on whether the takeover generates a positive or negative CWE to the
merging firms. We expect the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales to be more
prominent in the positive sub-sample.
We find that about 51% of the takeovers have a positive CWE for the merging firms over
the (-10, +10) window. For the positive CWE sub-sample, which is reported in Panel B of Table
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III, we find that the acquirer rivals experience, on average, a positive and significant abnormal
return at least at the 5% level in all four windows. For example, the average abnormal return of
acquirer rivals over the (-10, +10) window is 1.20% and is statistically significant at the 1%
level. The proportion of positive CARs is statistically significant at the 10% level only over the
(-10, +10) window. However, the z-statistic for the difference in means and the difference in
proportions between the positive and negative sub-samples is statistically significant for all
windows. The generally positive average stock price response of the acquirer rivals is
inconsistent with competitive advantage or foreclosure hypotheses but is consistent with better
information or collusion hypotheses.
Further, we find that target rivals experience, on average, a positive and significant
abnormal return at least at the 5% level in three of the four windows examined. For example, the
average abnormal return to target rivals over the (-10, +10) window is 0.86% and is significant at
the 5% level. The proportion of portfolios with a positive CAR is statistically significant for the
(-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows. The z-statistic for the difference in means between the positive
and negative sub-samples is statistically insignificant for all windows, whereas the z-statistic for
the difference in proportions is significant for two of the four windows. The weakly positive
average response for the target rivals is in the direction predicted by the better information
hypothesis, and is inconsistent with the competitive advantage, foreclosure, or collusion
hypotheses.16
In the positive CWE sub-sample, we also find that the main customer firms experience,
on average, a positive and significant abnormal return of 0.93% over the (-10, +10) window. The
abnormal returns over the other three windows are, however, insignificant. The proportion of
main customer portfolios with positive CARs is found to be insignificant over all event windows.
16

The positive response to target rivals is also consistent with the acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and
Walkling (2000) which suggests that unexpected acquisition attempts increase the likelihood of target rivals being
targets in future acquisitions. We control for this possibility in our cross-sectional analyses.
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However, the z-statistic for the difference in means and the difference in proportions between the
positive and negative sub-samples is statistically significant for at least one window examined.
While the evidence that the abnormal returns to main customers are positive can be characterized
as weak, the picture that clearly emerges is that the main customers do not appear to be harmed
as a result of foreclosure or collusion. Additionally, this evidence in conjunction with the
positive abnormal returns to the acquirer rivals and target rivals is consistent with the presence of
efficiency gains with the caveat that only a small part, if at all, of these efficiency gains are being
passed down to the main customers.
We expect the efficiency and anti-competitive effects of vertical takeovers to be more
pronounced for dependent customers rather than main customers since these are firms that
depend most on inputs supplied by the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. Consistent
with this expectation, we find that the dependent customer firms experience, on average, a
positive and significant abnormal return over all four event windows. For example, the average
abnormal return for dependent customers over the (-10, +10) window is 2.98% and significant at
the 1% level. Further, the proportion of portfolios with positive CARs is statistically significant
for the (-5, +5) and (-10, +10) windows. The z-statistic for the difference in means and the
difference in proportions between the positive and negative sub-samples is statistically
significant for at least three of the four event windows. The positive abnormal returns of
dependent customers support the efficiency hypothesis and complement our results of the
acquirer and target rivals in rejecting foreclosure and collusion hypotheses.
In Panel C of Table III, we report the results of the sub-sample where the merging firms
experience a negative CWE. While it is possible that the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion
rationales are valid in this sub-sample also, the negative CWE to the merging firm suggests that
there could be other more dominating motives. First, these takeovers could be driven by agency
problems prevalent in acquirer firms (Jensen (1986) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)).
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Second, these takeovers may be stock financed and, hence, could indicate overvaluation of the
acquirer‟s equity (Travlos (1987)). Finally, the acquirer expands into the supplier or customer
industry because its own industry faces negative prospects and the announcements of such
takeovers is perceived as new bad news regarding the acquirer firms and its industry (Mitchell
and Mulherin (1996)).
For the sub-sample with a negative CWE to the merging firms, we find that acquirer
rivals experience negative and significant abnormal returns over all event windows. The negative
response could indicate that the takeover is an attempt by the acquirer to expand into its supplier
or customer industry due to the bad prospects facing its own industry, and thereby conveys
negative information regarding all firms in the acquirer industry. Alternatively, if the negative
CWE suggests overvaluation of acquirer‟s equity, then the negative response to rivals means the
overvaluation could be industry-wide. Further, we find that the main and dependent customer
firms experience generally negative average abnormal returns. This result indicates that value
destroying vertical takeovers could have potentially harmful effects on firms that buy product of
the downstream industry of the vertical takeover. Finally, we find that target rivals experience
negative average abnormal returns but are statistically insignificant over most windows. These
weak results are consistent with the acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and Walkling
(2000) since the target rivals in value destroying takeovers could also be potential future targets.
As argued above, the announcement period wealth effects of the acquirer rivals, target
rivals, and customer firms in the positive CWE sub-sample are supportive of the efficiency
hypothesis. An alternative explanation, however, could be that these returns are not due to the
implied efficiency gains in the merger, but rather by a positive news regarding the industries
involving the merging firms which lead to a upward trend in these industries.17 To test this
explanation, we investigate the abnormal returns to the rivals and customers in the “pre17

We thank Chad Syverson for pointing this issue.
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announcement” period. If the announcement period wealth effects are an artifact of a general
trend in the industries involved in the merger, it is likely that we observe similar wealth effects in
the “pre-announcement” period also.
We use a “pre-announcement” period of (-40, -10) days and randomly assign this period
into windows of 5 days each. We then compute the abnormal returns to the acquirer/target rivals
and customer firms over each of these windows. In the sub-sample of deals with a positive CWE,
we find that abnormal returns to acquirer rivals are insignificant for 81% of the preannouncement windows, abnormal returns to target rivals are insignificant for 67% of the preannouncement windows, abnormal returns to main customer firms are insignificant for 74% of
the pre-announcement windows, and abnormal returns to dependent customers for 93% of the
pre-announcement windows. Similar insignificant wealth effects are also observed for a majority
of the “pre-announcement” windows in the sub-sample of deals with a negative CWE. The
generally insignificant wealth effects in the pre-announcement windows further support the view
that the observed announcement period wealth effects are not due to an industry trend but are
indeed driven by the implied efficiency gains in the takeover.
In summary, the above described univariate results uncover the following findings: (i) In
the sub-sample of takeovers where the merging firms experience a positive CWE, the acquirer
and target rivals tend to gain, main customer firms do not lose, and dependent customer firms
gain, and (ii) In the sub-sample of takeovers where merging firms experience a negative CWE,
the acquirer rivals lose, the main and dependent customer firms lose, whereas target rivals have
insignificant abnormal returns. The evidence in the positive CWE sub-sample is inconsistent
with foreclosure or collusion hypotheses, and, on balance, suggests that vertical takeovers are
likely to be driven by efficiency gains.18

18

We perform the following test to investigate the robustness of our univariate results. Use of the first bid by the
successful acquirer may understate target returns since the target is in play since the announcement of the first bid in
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3.6. Additional tests for foreclosure and collusion
The rival/customer portfolios are based on all Compustat firms and therefore can include
firms that operate anywhere in the United States. If the merging firms do not operate nationally,
it is unlikely that rivals and customers that are distant from the geographic regions of the
merging firms will register any wealth effects. As a robustness check, we repeat our tests using
rivals and customers that are geographically “closer” to the merging firms. Specifically, we form
acquirer (target) rival portfolios based on firms with the same headquarter state as the acquirer
(target) and customer portfolios based on firms with the same headquarter state as either the
acquirer or target. The wealth effects for rival/customer portfolios based on only the regional
firms are largely similar to those based on all Compustat firms. In the positive CWE sub-sample,
which is of main interest, we find that the acquirer rivals and target rivals gain, main customer
firms do not lose, and dependent customer firms gain. The results for the overall sample and
negative CWE sub-sample are qualitatively similar to those reported in Panels A and C of Table
III. Therefore, while using only the regional firms, our evidence is still inconsistent with the
foreclosure and collusion rationales.
As an additional test for the anti-competitive rationales, we identify sub-samples where
foreclosure and collusion are more likely to occur. For this purpose, we use the non-horizontal
merger guidelines of the U.S. antitrust authorities that are used to categorize vertical takeovers as
anti-competitive.19 The guidelines state that vertical takeovers where the acquirer industry
concentration exceeds 1,800 can be challenged on grounds of collusion or where the target
market share exceeds 20% can be challenged on grounds of foreclosure. We expect foreclosure
and collusion would at least appear in the sub-samples identified by the above criteria.
the contest. Therefore, we compute the target CAR for the window of (-10, +10) days around the period between the
announcement of the first bid in the contest to the announcement of successful bid in the contest. Acquirer CAR is
still measured for the window of (-10, +10) days around the period between the announcement of the first bid by the
successful acquirer and the announcement of the successful bid. The wealth effects of the rivals/customers under this
approach are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table III.
19
For an overview of the criteria refer http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm
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We identify two sub-samples to perform our tests: (i) all takeovers with a positive CWE
to the merging firms and where the acquirer industry concentration is greater than 1,800, and (ii)
all takeovers with a positive CWE to the merging firms and where the target market share is
greater than 20%. We restrict our analysis to only those takeovers with a positive CWE to the
merging firms since foreclosure and collusion hypotheses predict value creation for the merging
firms. As before, we use the (-10, +10) event window to measure the CWE of the merging firms.
We measure the acquirer industry concentration as the sales-based Herfindahl index, computed
as the sum of squares of market shares of all firms on Compustat with the same four-digit
primary SIC code as the acquirer during the year of announcement. We measure market share of
the target based on the sales of all firms on Compustat with the same four-digit primary SIC code
as the target during the year of announcement.
In unreported results, we find that the average CAR to the acquirer rivals, target rivals,
main customers, and dependent customers is positive in both these sub-samples. Thereby, we
provide additional evidence that is inconsistent with foreclosure and collusion.

4. Cross-Sectional Predictions and Results
In Section 3, we solely rely on our univariate predictions on the signs of abnormal returns
to the merging firms, rivals, and customer firms. The evidence there is largely consistent with the
efficiency hypothesis. In the cross-sectional analyses we include all vertical deals and do not rely
on the positive-negative CWE split that was used in the univariate analysis. Further, since the
efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses are not mutually exclusive to each other, we
include economic variables related to each of the three hypotheses and investigate how these
variables influence the wealth effects of the merging firms, rivals, and customers. We also
include control variables for other motives that the extant literature has shown to be driving the
deals with a negative CWE. Therefore, the cross-sectional analyses provide additional
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corroborating evidence to disentangle the three rationales for vertical takeovers. In this section,
we first investigate the determinants of the CWE to the merging firms. We then examine the
determinants of the wealth effect of acquirer/target rivals and customer firms.
4.1. Determinants of the combined wealth effect of the merging firms
We propose the cross-sectional model given by Eq. (1) to examine the determinants of
the CWE to the merging firms. In the model, CWE is the value weighted abnormal return to the
merging firms, RDICHG is the proxy for the extent of the future holdup, MKTSHACQ is the
acquirer‟s market share in its primary four-digit SIC industry, MKTSHTAR is the target‟s market
share in its primary four-digit SIC industry, CONCACQ is the concentration of the acquirer
industry, ACQCF is the acquirer cash flow, ACQCF (q<1) is the interaction between the acquirer
cash flow and a dummy variable that equals one if acquirer‟s Tobin‟s q is less than one and zero
otherwise, TAR (q>1) is a dummy that equals one if the target Tobin‟s q exceeds one and zero
otherwise, FORCOMPACQ and FORCOMPTAR are the intensity of foreign competition in acquirer
and target industry respectively, and CONTROLS include relative size and dummies for stock
offers and hostile offers.
CWE     1 * RDICHG   2 * MKTSH ACQ   3 * MKTSHTAR   4 * CONC ACQ   5 * ACQCF
  6 * ACQCF (q  1)   7 * TAR (q  1)   8 * FORCOMPACQ   9 * FORCOMPTAR  CONTROLS

Under the efficiency hypothesis, firms vertically integrate when they expect potential for
future holdup. Since the vertically integrated structure gives more flexibility than the nonintegrated structure to make relationship-specific investments (RSI), we expect an increase in the
intensity of RSI post-merger. Further, we expect this change to be higher, the higher the extent of
future holdup. Prior research has used the level of R&D intensity to measure RSI. For example,
Levy (1985) uses R&D intensity as proxy for transaction-specific capital and finds a positive
relationship between R&D intensity and vertical integration. Allen and Phillips (2000) suggest
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(1)

that industries with high R&D intensity are more likely to create relationship-specific assets.
Kale and Shahrur (2007) use R&D intensity as a proxy for RSI and find that firms use less debt
in their capital structure to induce RSI by customers and suppliers. We measure R&D intensity
of the acquirer and target as the ratio of R&D expenditure (Compustat data item 46) to total
assets (Compustat data item 6).20
The pre-merger level of RSI is calculated as the asset weighted R&D intensity of the
acquirer and target firm and the post-merger level of RSI as the R&D intensity of the integrated
firm. Further, since R&D intensity is a function of the industry in which firms operate, we adjust
the raw R&D intensity by the industry median values. The pre and post industry median R&D
intensities are calculated as the asset weighted R&D intensity of the median firm in the acquirer
and target industry for the year in consideration. Industry-adjusted change in R&D intensity
(RDICHG), which is our proxy for the extent of holdup, is calculated as the difference between
the industry-adjusted post-merger level of RSI and the industry-adjusted pre-merger level of RSI.
We posit that when the potential for holdup is higher, the higher would be the industry-adjusted
change in R&D intensity, and also the higher would be gains from vertical integration ( 1  0 ).
As measures of potential foreclosure, we include the acquirer and target market shares
during the year of takeover announcement. Under foreclosure, the higher the market share of the
acquirer (target), the higher is the market power to the integrated firm to foreclose the nonintegrated target (acquirer) rivals, and hence, the higher should be the gains to the merging firms
(  2  0 ,  3  0 ). Acquirer (target) market share is measured based on the sales of all firms on
Compustat with the same four-digit primary SIC code as the acquirer (target) during the year of
announcement. As a measure for potential collusion, we include the concentration of the acquirer

20

As in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) and Kale and Shahrur (2007), we
replace missing observations of R&D expenditure by zero. The mean value of RDICHG for the overall sample is
0.05%. For the sub-sample of takeovers with a positive CWE to merging firms, the mean RDICHG is 0.63%, and
for the sub-sample of takeovers with negative CWE, the mean RDICHG is -0.58%.
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industry. Under collusion, the higher the concentration of the acquirer industry, the higher is the
likelihood of collusion between the integrated firm and the non-integrated acquirer rivals after
the vertical takeover and, hence, the higher should be the gains to the merging firms (  4  0 ).
Acquirer industry concentration is measured as the sales-based Herfindahl index and computed
as the sum of squares of market shares of all firms on Compustat with the acquirer‟s four-digit
primary SIC code during the announcement year.21
In our univariate analysis, we find that a significant proportion of vertical takeovers are
associated with a negative CWE to the merging firms. To investigate if agency problems in
acquirers lead to the negative CWE, we include as control variables, acquirer cash flow
(ACQCF) and an interaction between the acquirer cash flow and a dummy variable that equals
one if acquirer‟s Tobin‟s q is less than one and zero otherwise (ACQCF (q<1)). This approach is
consistent with Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991). Under the agency hypothesis, cash rich
acquirers with low Tobin‟s q are more likely to engage in value-destroying acquisitions.
Accordingly, the higher the cash flows with a low q acquirer, the greater is the extent of value
destruction (  6  0 ). Further, as in Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), we include a dummy
variable that equals one if the target Tobin‟s q is greater than one and zero otherwise (TAR
(q>1)). Targets with low Tobin‟s q have poor quality of current management, and hence the
higher would be the potential gains from a change in control (  7  0 ). Consistent with their
approach, we measure Tobin‟s q as the book value of assets plus the market value of equity less
the book value of equity divided by the book value of assets, and cash flow as operating income

21

Since the antitrust authorities use critical values of industry concentration, we use a dummy variable that is equal
to one for takeovers where acquirer industry concentration is greater than 1,800 and zero otherwise instead of raw
values of concentration. The results under this approach are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
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before depreciation less interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends and common dividends for
the calendar year prior to the takeover normalized by the book value of assets.22
In all our regressions, we include intensity of foreign competition in the acquirer
(FORCOMPACQ) and target (FORCOMPTAR) industries as additional control variables since
imports can increase the level of competition in an industry (Katics and Peterson (1994)). We
measure the intensity of foreign competition in the acquirer (target) industry as ratio of the level
of imports in the acquirer (target) industry to the total supply in the acquirer (target) industry.
These measures are similar to the proxies used in Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Shahrur
(2005). Consistent with the extant takeover literature, we use relative size (Servaes (1991),
Mulherin and Boone (2000), and Shahrur (2005)), a dummy for stock offers (Travlos (1987)),
and a dummy for hostile takeovers (Schwert (2000) and Shahrur (2005)) as additional control
variables. We measure relative size as the ratio of the target market capitalization to the acquirer
market capitalization fifteen days prior to announcement of the first bid by the successful
acquirer.
We report the results for the CWE regression in Table IV. We use a window of (-10, +10)
days around the period between the announcement of first bid by the successful acquirer to the
announcement of the successful bid in the contest to calculate CWE. We calculate the industryadjusted change in R&D intensity (RDICHG) for calendar year windows (-1, +2), and (-2, +2)
years around the year of takeover announcement. Consistent with the extant takeover literature,
we implement weighted least square (WLS) regressions where the weights are the inverse of the
standard deviation of the market model residuals. Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams (1990)
argue that bidder managers voluntarily engage in takeovers when they possess private
information regarding the potential synergies of the takeover. In such cases, the cross sectional

22

Tobin‟s q is measured as {DATA6 + (DATA25*DATA199) - DATA60}/DATA6, and Cash flow as {DATA13 DATA15 - (DATA16 - Change in DATA35) - DATA19 - DATA21} divided by DATA6.
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regressions based on OLS and WLS are inconsistent. To account for this endogeneity, they
construct a consistent maximum likelihood estimator to relate announcement wealth effects to
exogenous firm and industry characteristics. We also perform regressions using their approach.
Consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, we find that the coefficient on industryadjusted change in R&D intensity (RDICHG) is positive and significant under the maximum
likelihood (MLE) approach for both (-1, +2) and (-2, +2) calendar-year windows. We obtain
somewhat weaker results under the weighted least square estimation (WLS) method. Inconsistent
with the foreclosure hypothesis, the coefficients on acquirer market share and target market share
are statistically insignificant under both the WLS and MLE methods. Inconsistent with the
collusion hypothesis, the coefficient on acquirer industry concentration is statistically
insignificant under both the WLS and MLE methods.23
We find that the coefficient on the cash flow for low q acquirers (ACQCF (q<1)) is
negative and statistically significant except for the WLS estimation for (-1, +2) calendar-year
window. This evidence suggests that agency problems in acquirers lead to lower takeover gains
and is consistent with the findings in Lang, Stulz, Walkling (1991). Further, we find that low q
targets (Target q >1) are associated with higher takeover gains under both WLS and MLE
estimation. If low q targets have inefficient management, then this result suggests that a change
in control through a corporate takeover creates value.
We find that the coefficients on the intensity of foreign competition in the acquirer and
target industry are insignificant. Consistent with the extant takeover literature, we find that
relative size is positively related to the takeover gains, stock financed takeovers are associated
with lower takeover gains, and hostile takeovers are associated with higher takeover gains.
Finally, the standard error of manager‟s private information (W) is positive and significant
23

Since we include both market share and industry concentration as independent variables in our regressions, a valid
concern is if there is multicollinearity in the data. To address this concern, we compute the variance inflation factor
for all independent variables. It is found to be less than 2 suggesting that multicollinearity is not an important factor.
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suggesting that the model of Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams (1990) is well specified. In
summary, the results from the CWE regression are consistent with the efficiency hypothesis and
inconsistent with the foreclosure or collusion hypotheses.
4.2. Determinants of the wealth effects of acquirer and target rivals
We propose the cross-sectional models given by Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) to explain the crosssectional variation in the abnormal returns to the acquirer and target rivals respectively. In the
models, ACQRIVCAR is the abnormal return to the non-integrated acquirer rivals, TARRIVCAR
is the abnormal return to the non-integrated target rivals, Initial is a dummy set to one if there
was no acquisition between the acquirer and target three-digit SIC codes during one year prior to
the takeover announcement and set to zero otherwise, STOCK is a dummy set to one when the
deal is stock financed and zero otherwise, HOSTILE is a dummy set to one for acquisitions
reported as hostile by SDC and zero otherwise. All other variables are as described in Eq. (1).
ACQRIVCAR     1 * CWE   2 * MKTSHTAR   3 * CONCACQ   4 * Initial   5 * FORCOMPACQ   6 * FORCOMPTAR
  7 * STOCK   8 * HOSTILE

(2)

TARRIVCAR    1 * CWE   2 * MKTSH ACQ  3 * CONCACQ   4 * Initial  5 * FORCOMPACQ   6 * FORCOMPTAR
  7 * STOCK  8 * HOSTILE

(3)

A negative coefficient on CWE (  1 ) is consistent with either the competitive advantage
view of the efficiency hypothesis or the foreclosure hypothesis. Under the competitive advantage
view, the gains to the non-integrated acquirer rivals and the merging firms are negatively related
because the non-integrated acquirer rivals now face an efficient integrated firm. Under the
foreclosure hypothesis, the negative relation arises because of the enhanced ability of the
integrated firm to foreclose the non-integrated acquirer rivals. To distinguish between the two
scenarios, we examine the coefficient on the market share of the target. The higher the target‟s
market share, the higher is the ability of the integrated firm to foreclose the non-integrated
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acquirer rivals, thereby resulting in lower gains to the non-integrated acquirer rivals. Hence, we
expect  2 to be negative only under foreclosure.
On the other hand, a positive coefficient on CWE (  1 ) is consistent with either the better
information view of efficiency hypothesis or the collusion hypothesis. Under the better
information view, the returns to the non-integrated acquirer rivals and the merging firms are
positively related since there is new information to the rivals regarding efficiency improvement
through vertical integration. Under the collusion hypothesis, the positive relation arises due to
the higher likelihood of collusion between the integrated firm and the non-integrated acquirer
rivals. To distinguish between the two explanations, we examine the coefficient on the
concentration of the acquirer industry. Under the collusion hypothesis, the higher the
concentration of the acquirer industry, the higher is the likelihood of collusion between the
integrated firm and the non-integrated acquirer rivals, and consequently the higher the gains to
the acquirer rivals. Hence, we expect  3 to be positive only under collusion.
The predictions for the target rival CAR regression are as follows. A positive coefficient
on CWE (  1 ) is consistent with the better information view of the efficiency hypothesis. The
positive relation arises since the takeover announcement provides new information to the nonintegrated target rivals regarding efficiency improvement through vertical integration. A negative
coefficient on CWE (  1 ) is consistent with competitive advantage, foreclosure, or collusion
hypotheses. Under the competitive advantage view, the negative relation arises because the nonintegrated target rivals now have to compete with an efficient integrated firm. Under the
foreclosure hypothesis, the negative relation arises due to the enhanced ability of the integrated
firm to foreclose non-integrated target rivals. Finally, under the collusion hypothesis, the
negative relation arises due to the ensuing collusion between the integrated firm and the nonintegrated acquirer rivals.
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The coefficient on the acquirer market share allows us to distinguish between foreclosure
and the other two competing hypotheses. The higher the acquirer‟s market share, the higher is
the ability of the integrated firm to foreclose the non-integrated target rivals, and hence the lower
the gains to the non-integrated target rivals. Hence, we expect  2 to be negative under
foreclosure. To test the collusion hypothesis, we look at the coefficient on the acquirer industry
concentration. The higher the concentration of the acquirer industry, the lower the gains to the
non-integrated target rivals, due to higher input prices on account of upstream collusion (forward
takeovers) or a reduced demand for their output on account of downstream collusion (backward
takeovers). Hence, we expect  3 to be negative under collusion.
The acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and Walkling (2000) suggests that
unexpected acquisition attempts create a reassessment of the likelihood of acquisition attempts
for target rivals. Under this hypothesis, the magnitude of abnormal returns to the target rivals is
increasing in the degree of surprise in the acquisition. To test this hypothesis, we include Initial,
which is a dummy that equals one when there is no acquisition between the acquirer and target
three-digit SIC codes during the one year prior to the takeover announcement and equals zero
otherwise as a control variable. Under their hypothesis, we expect the coefficient on Initial to be
positive in the target rival CAR regression.24 In both the acquirer rival CAR and target rival CAR
regressions, we include a dummy for stock offers, a dummy for hostile offers, and the intensity
of foreign competition in the acquirer and target industries as additional control variables. If
stock financed takeovers provide new information regarding industry-wide overvaluation in the
acquirer‟s industry, then the returns to the acquirer rivals would also be related to the nature of
takeover financing and we expect a negative coefficient on the stock dummy (  7  0 ).

24

To be consistent, we include Initial as a control variable in the acquirer rival CAR regression as well. Our results
do not change if we exclude Initial from the acquirer rival CAR regression.

- 42 -

The regression results for the wealth effects of the non-integrated acquirer and target
rivals are reported in Table V. We use an event window of (-10, +10) days around the
announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer to measure acquirer/target rival CARs
and an event window of (-10, +10) days around the period between the announcement of first bid
by the successful acquirer and the announcement of the successful bid in the contest to measure
the CWE of the merging firms. We winsorize the dependent variables at the 1st and the 99th
percentile to account for outliers in the sample and perform weighted least square estimation.
In the acquirer rival CAR regression, we find that the coefficient on CWE is positive and
significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the better information view or collusion
motives and is inconsistent with the competitive advantage or foreclosure hypotheses. The
coefficient on the acquirer industry concentration is insignificant, which is inconsistent with the
collusion hypothesis. Further, inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis, the coefficient on
target market share is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on Initial is insignificant
suggesting that the magnitude of surprise does not affect the abnormal returns to the nonintegrated acquirer rivals. We also find that the coefficient on the stock dummy is statistically
insignificant. This indicates that the performance of acquirer rivals cannot be explained by the
industry-wide over-valuation due to equity financing. Finally, the coefficient on the hostile
dummy is statistically insignificant suggesting that hostility in takeovers has no implications for
rivals in the acquirer industry.
In the target rival CAR regression, we find that the coefficient on CWE is positive and
significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the better information view of efficiency
hypothesis and inconsistent with the competitive advantage, foreclosure or collusion hypotheses.
The coefficient on the acquirer market share is statistically insignificant, which is inconsistent
with the foreclosure hypothesis. Further, inconsistent with the collusion hypothesis, the
coefficient on acquirer industry concentration is statistically insignificant. Finally, the coefficient
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on Initial is positive and significant at the 5% level which indicates that the returns to the target
rivals are positively related to the magnitude of surprise in the vertical takeover. This result is
consistent with the acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and Walkling (2000). The
coefficient on the hostile dummy is negative and significant, indicating that target rivals in
hostile acquisitions experience lower abnormal returns. The coefficients on the intensity of
foreign competition in the acquirer and target industries are insignificant in both acquirer rival
and target rival regressions.
Collectively, we find that the CWE of the merging firms is positively related to the
returns to the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals. Further, the acquirer/target market shares
(our measures for potential foreclosure), and acquirer industry concentration (our measure for
potential collusion) do not affect abnormal returns to the rivals. These results appear to be
consistent with the efficiency rationale and inconsistent with the anti-competitive rationales.
4.3. Determinants of the wealth effect of customers
We propose the regression model specified in Eq. (4) to examine the determinants of the
wealth effects of main and dependent customers. In the model, CUSTCAR is the abnormal return
to the customer firms and all other variables are as described in Eq. (1).
CUSTCAR    1 * CWE   2 * MKTSH ACQ   3 * MKTSHTAR   4 * CONCACQ   5 * FORCOMPACQ   6 * FORCOMPTAR
  7 * STOCK   8 * HOSTILE

(4)

Under the efficiency hypothesis, we expect that at least some of these benefits arising
through reduced transaction costs to be passed on to customers through lower prices. Therefore,
under efficiency, we expect the customer returns and the CWE of the merging firms to be
positively related ( 1  0 ). In contrast, under foreclosure and collusion, the increased market
power of the integrated firm enables it to extract rents from customer firms. Hence, we expect
the customer return and the CWE of the merging firms to be negatively related ( 1  0 ). Under
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the foreclosure hypothesis, the higher the market share of the acquirer (target), the higher is the
market power of the integrated firm to foreclose the non-integrated target (acquirer) rivals, which
in turn leads to lower gains to the customers (  2  0 ,  3  0 ). Finally, under the collusion
hypothesis, the higher the concentration of the acquirer industry, the higher is the likelihood of
collusion between the integrated firm and the non-integrated acquirer rivals after the vertical
takeover. The increased likelihood of collusion leads to lower gains to the customers (  4  0 ).
As additional control variables, we include a dummy for stock offers, a dummy for hostile
takeovers, and the intensity of foreign competition in the acquirer and target industries.
The results for the main and dependent customer CAR regressions are reported in Table
VI. We use an event window of (-10, +10) days around the announcement of the first bid by the
successful acquirer to measure the main and dependent customer returns and an event window of
(-10, +10) days around the period between the announcement of first bid by the successful
acquirer and the announcement of the successful bid in the contest to measure the CWE of the
merging firms. We winsorize the dependent variables at the 1st and the 99th percentile to account
for outliers in the sample and perform weighted least square estimation.
Consistent with the efficiency hypothesis and inconsistent with the foreclosure and
collusion hypotheses, we find that the coefficient on CWE is positive and significant at least at
the 5% level in both the main and dependent customer regressions. Inconsistent with the
collusion hypothesis, we find that the coefficient on the acquirer industry concentration is
insignificant in both the main and dependent customer regressions. Further, going against the
predictions of the foreclosure hypothesis, the coefficient on acquirer market share is positive and
significant in the dependent customer regression, while it is insignificant in the main customer
regression. Similarly, inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis, the coefficient on the target
market share is statistically insignificant in both the main and dependent customer regressions.
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The coefficients on the intensity of foreign competition and other control variables are generally
statistically insignificant in both the main customer and dependent customer regressions.25
To summarize, we find a positive and significant relationship between the CWE of the
merging firms and the returns to the main and dependent customers. Further, the acquirer/target
market share (our measures for potential foreclosure), and acquirer industry concentration (our
measure for potential collusion) affect customer returns in manner inconsistent with these
rationales. This evidence is again supportive of the efficiency rationale and inconsistent with
foreclosure and collusion hypotheses.
5. Conclusions
Vertical integration has been a topic of interest to the economists over several decades
(Joskow (2005)). However, little is known regarding the sources of value creation in vertical
takeovers. We attempt to bridge this gap by conducting the first comprehensive, large sample
study that investigates the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical takeovers.
For this purpose, we identify a sample of 453 successful vertical takeovers over the period 19812004 using the benchmark input-output accounts of the U.S. economy. To examine the three
rationales for vertical takeovers, we analyze the announcement period wealth effects of the
merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and customer firms. Our research design includes
univariate predictions on the signs of the wealth effects to the above parties, as well as crosssectional analyses which include structural variables related to the efficiency, foreclosure, and
collusion hypotheses.
Consistent with the extant literature, we find that vertical takeovers are associated with a
positive average combined wealth effect (CWE) for the merging firms. In the sub-sample of
25

To investigate if the vertical acquisition is truly a novel transaction (first vertical merger involving acquirer/target
industry) or just moving to the industry norm (later vertical mergers), we use the Compustat segment tapes and find
the percentage of firms in the acquirer (target) industry that have a segment in the target (acquirer) industry, i.e.
already vertically integrated. The mean (median) value of this variable is 2.89% (0.65%). We include this variable in
the CWE, ACQRIVCAR, TARRIVCAR, and CUSTCAR regressions and find that it is statistically insignificant.
The results for the other independent variables are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
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takeovers where the merging firms experience a positive CWE, we find that the acquirer rivals
and target rivals tend to gain, main customer firms do not lose, and dependent customer firms
gain. In our cross-sectional tests, we find that the CWE of the merging firms is positively related
to abnormal returns to the acquirer rivals, target rivals, main customers, and dependent
customers. Concentration of the acquirer industry (our proxy to test collusion), and market share
of the acquirer/target firm (our proxies for foreclosure) affect to the wealth effects of the merging
firms, target/acquirer rivals, and customer firms in a manner inconsistent with the predictions of
these anti-competitive rationales. Finally, the industry-adjusted change in R&D intensity of the
merging firms around the year of takeover announcement (proxy for the extent of holdup) is
positively related to the CWE of the merging firms.
Collectively, both our univariate and cross-sectional results indicate that firms use
corporate takeovers to alter their vertical boundaries consistent with an efficiency improvement
rationale rather than foreclosure or collusion rationales. Our findings build upon the work in
Eckbo (1983) and Rosengren and Meehan (1994) which does not find evidence supporting anticompetitive motives in vertical takeovers challenged by FTC and DOJ prior to 1978. Further, our
evidence advances the industry-specific case studies which find that vertical integration is
efficiency enhancing (Mullin and Mullin (1997), Chipty (2001), and Hortaçsu and Syverson
(2007)). Finally, the non-horizontal merger guidelines of FTC and DOJ, originally set forth in
1984, still remain in place leading to several vertical merger challenges in the 1990‟s on grounds
of foreclosure or collusion (Morse (1998) and Warren-Boulton (2002)). In this regard, our
analysis of the rivals and, in particular, the customer firms may be of interest to the regulators
since it provides new information on the welfare effects of vertical takeovers in recent years.
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Appendix A
Pairs of Acquirer and Target Input-Output Industries and Vertical Relatedness Coefficients
This appendix contains examples of acquirer and target input-output industries that have significant vertical relationships based on V1,TA and V1,AT. ACQIODESC
and TARIODESC are the descriptions of the six-digit input-output industries of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. ACQIOCODE and TARIOCODE are the inputoutput industry codes for acquirer and target industries as obtained from Use Table of Bureau of Economic Analysis. The 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 Use tables
are used to identify vertical relations in takeovers during the periods 1981 to 1985, 1986 to 1990, 1991 to 1997, and 1998 to 2004 respectively. V1,AT (V2,AT) is the
dollar flow from the acquirer to the target industry per dollar of acquirer (target) industry total output. V1,TA (V2,TA) is the dollar flow from the target industry to the
acquirer industry per dollar of acquirer (target) industry output. Acquirer vertical relatedness coefficient (ACQVRC) is calculated as Max (V1,AT, V1,TA). Target
vertical relatedness coefficient (TARVRC) is calculated as Max (V2,AT, V2,TA). For every acquirer-target industry pair in the appendix, the values of V1,AT, V1,TA, V2,AT,
and V2,TA are calculated as the average values across different Use Tables that correspond to the time period during which vertical takeovers appear in the sample.
ACQIOCODE
310101
680201
142300
160100
190200
331315
280100
280200
680200
670000
3221A0
760101
311611
140101
560300
325211
142300
600100
334119
326192
570300
334413

ACQIODESC
Petroleum refining
Natural gas transportation
Flavoring extracts and flavoring syrups
Broad woven fabric mills
House furnishings
Aluminum sheet, plate, and foil mfg.
Plastics materials and resins
Synthetic rubber
Gas production and distribution (utilities)
Radio and TV broadcasting
Paper and paperboard mills
Motion picture services and theaters
Animal, except poultry, slaughtering
Meat packing plants
Telephone and telegraph apparatus
Plastics material and resin manufacturing
Flavoring extracts and flavoring syrups
Aircraft
Other computer peripheral equipment mfg.
Resilient floor covering manufacturing
Other electronic components
Semiconductors and related device mfg.

TARIOCODE
080000
310101
142200
180400
160100
331312
270100
270100
080000
760101
322210
670000
311612
140102
570300
325190
740000
600200
334111
325211
320400
334111

TARIODESC

V1,AT

V1,TA

V2,AT

V2,TA

Crude petroleum and natural gas
Petroleum refining
Bottled and canned soft drinks
Apparel made from purchased materials
Broad woven fabric mills
Primary aluminum production
Industrial inorganic and organic chemicals
Industrial inorganic and organic chemicals
Crude petroleum and natural gas
Motion picture services and theaters
Paperboard container manufacturing
Radio and TV broadcasting
Meat processed from carcasses
Sausages and other prepared meat products
Other electronic components
Other basic organic chemical manufacturing
Eating and drinking places
Aircraft and missile engines and engine parts
Electronic computer mfg.
Plastics material and resin manufacturing
Miscellaneous plastics products
Electronic computer manufacturing

<0.01
0.64
0.49
0.37
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.01
<0.01
0.25
0.20
0.20
0.20
<0.01
<0.01
0.17
<0.01
0.11
<0.01
<0.01
0.11

0.67
0.02
<0.01
<0.01
0.37
0.36
0.35
0.31
0.30
0.25
0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.20
0.19
<0.01
0.14
0.01
0.11
0.11
<0.01

<0.01
0.07
0.18
0.18
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.44
0.23
0.37
0.52
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.07
<0.01
<0.01
0.14

0.74
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.08
0.35
0.13
0.01
0.20
0.28
0.02
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01
0.13
0.15
<0.01
0.35
<0.01
<0.01
0.05
<0.01
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Table I
Summary of Univariate Predictions for the Efficiency, Foreclosure and Collusion Hypotheses
This table summarizes the predictions under the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses regarding the signs of announcement period abnormal returns to the
merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and customer firms. Acquirer rivals are firms with the same four-digit primary SIC code as the acquirer, but no segment in the
target‟s four-digit primary SIC code. Target rivals are firms with the same four-digit primary SIC code as the target, but no segment in the acquirer‟s four-digit primary SIC
code. Irrespective of the type of vertical takeover (forward or backward), we identify customers as firms that buy the product of the downstream industry in the vertical
takeover.
Merging firms

Non-integrated
Acquirer rivals

Non-Integrated
Target Rivals

Customers

Positive
Reduction in future holdup

Positive
Implement efficiency
enhancing vertical takeovers

Positive
Implement efficiency
enhancing vertical takeovers

Zero to Positive
Series of vertical acquisitions,
lower costs passed as lower
prices

Positive
Reduction in future holdup

Negative
Still face holdup,
competitive disadvantage

Negative
Still face holdup,
competitive disadvantage

Foreclosure

Positive
Integrated firm has an unfair
advantage over rivals

Negative
Backward Takeover: Squeezed
margins due to higher input
prices from integrated firm
Forward Takeover: Reduced
revenues since integrated firm
does not buy their output

Negative
Backward Takeover: Integrated
firm does not buy the output of
independent suppliers
Forward Takeover: Squeezed
margins due to higher input
prices from integrated firm

Negative
Increased market power of the
integrated firm

Collusion between integrated firm
and acquirer rivals

Positive
Higher likelihood of collusion
enhances ability to extract
rents from customers

Positive
Higher likelihood of collusion
enhances ability to extract
rents from customers

Negative
Backward Takeover:
Downstream collusion leads to
a reduced demand for their
output
Forward Takeover: Upstream
collusion leads to higher input
prices

Negative
Face higher prices due to
collusion upstream

Efficiency hypothesis:
i) Better Information

ii) Competitive Advantage

Zero to Positive
More intense competition
upstream
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Table II
Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Takeovers during 1981-2004
The sample consists of 453 successful vertical takeovers during 1981 to 2004. The acquirer and target firms are
public and the acquisition is recorded on the SDC database. Takeovers where either the acquirer or target has an
SIC code between 6000-6999 are not considered. Tender offers and Mergers are identified based on the
classification of the SDC database. The attitude of the deal is characterized as hostile, neutral or friendly based
on the attitude of the first bid in the contest as reported by SDC. Method of Payment is characterized by SDC as
all stock deals, all cash deals, and deals using both cash and stock as means of financing. Market capitalizations
of the acquirer and target are calculated fifteen trading days prior to the announcement of the first bid date by
the successful acquirer in the contest. Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index is the sales based Herfindahl Index of
the four-digit SIC of the acquirer during the takeover year. Acquirer (Target) Market Share is the market share
of the acquirer (target) in its primary industry during the year of the takeover. V1,AT (V2,AT) is the dollar flow
from the acquirer to the target industry per dollar of acquirer (target) industry total output. V1,TA (V2,TA) is the
dollar flow from the target industry to the acquirer industry per dollar of acquirer (target) industry output.
Acquirer vertical relatedness coefficient (ACQVRC) is calculated as Max (V1,AT, V1,TA). Target vertical
relatedness coefficient (TARVRC) is calculated as Max (V2,AT, V2,TA). Takeovers in this sample have either
ACQVRC or TARVRC greater than 1%.
Deal characteristics for the overall vertical takeover sample
Sample
size
Characteristic

Number

% of sample

Merger

305

67.33%

148
124
155

32.67%
27.37%
34.32%

Mode of Acquisition

453

Method of Payment

453

Tender Offer
Only Stock
Only Cash

453

Stock and Cash
Friendly
Hostile

174
388
23

38.41%
85.65%
5.08%

Neutral

42

9.27%

Attitude

Firm/Industry characteristics and vertical relatedness for the overall sample
Firm/Industry Characteristics

Mean

Median

Max

Min

15,658.89
669.58

2,014.64
129.49

276,097.00
24,655.33

8.26
1.25

Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index

2,127

1,484

8,683

186

Acquirer Market Share (%)

16.68

6.46

71.78

0.10

Target Market Share (%)

5.82

1.62

35.33

0.02

Vertical Relations

Mean

Median

Max

Min

V1,AT

0.07

0.02

0.71

0.00

V1,TA

0.08

0.03

0.66

0.00

V2,AT

0.07

0.03

0.51

0.00

V2,TA
ACQVRC
TARVRC

0.08
0.09
0.09

0.03
0.05
0.05

0.74
0.71
0.74

0.00
0.01
0.01

Acquirer Market Capitalization ($ mil)
Target Market Capitalization ($ mil)
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Table III
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Acquirer Rivals, Target Rivals and Customers
This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to the acquirer rival, target rival, main customer, and dependent customer
portfolios in the vertical takeover sample based on a 1% cutoff. Acquirer CAR and Target CAR is measured around the window (-10,
+10) days around the period running from the first bid by the successful acquirer to the announcement of the successful bid in the
contest. Combined wealth effect (CWE) of a takeover is the value weighted CAR to the acquirer and target, where the weights are
computed using the market capitalization of the acquirer fifteen trading days prior to the announcement of the first bid by the
successful acquirer. Acquirer rival and target rival portfolios are based on all Compustat firms during the takeover year. We exclude
firms with segments in target (acquirer) primary SIC while constructing acquirer (target) rival portfolios. The main customer industry
is identified as the industry that accounts for the highest proportion of the total output of the downstream industry in the vertical
takeover as long as it is greater than 1%. Dependent customer industry is identified as the industry that receives the highest proportion
of its inputs from the downstream industry in vertical takeover to produce its total output as long as it is greater than 1%. Customer
portfolios are based on single segment firms in Compustat. The acquirer rival portfolio, target rival portfolio, and customer portfolio
returns are calculated as equally weighted returns for the (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5), and (-10, +10) trading day windows around the
first bid by the successful acquirer. Z statistics are used to test if the mean cumulative abnormal returns are statistically different from
zero and are provided in the parentheses. % positive represents the proportion of portfolios that have positive returns. A generalized
sign test is performed to test their statistical significance. Number is the number of portfolios of rivals or customers and Mean
(Median) is the mean (median) number of firms in each rival or customer portfolio. Panel A provides the CARs for the overall sample.
Panel B provides the CARs for the sub-sample of takeovers with a positive CWE over the (-10, +10) window, and Panel C for the
negative CWE sub-sample over the same window. Panel D provides the z statistic for the difference between the positive and negative
combined CAR sub-samples. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

Panel A: Abnormal returns for overall sample of vertical takeovers
Acquirer Rivals
Target Rivals
Main Customer
Dependent Customer
Number
N=438
N=445
N=382
N=374
Mean (Median)
52 (25)
59 (28)
61 (21)
25 (8)
Event Windows:
Mean
% Positive
Mean
% Positive
Mean
% Positive
Mean
% Positive
(-1,+1)
0.00
49.09
0.22
54.71
0.19
50.00
0.00
45.72**
(0.31)
(-0.94)
(1.41)
(1.20)
(1.17)
(-0.72)
(0.41)
(-2.06)
(-2,+2)
0.07
49.77
0.18
52.24
0.11
49.21
0.25
52.67
(0.88)
(-0.65)
(0.81)
(0.16)
(0.76)
(-1.03)
(1.20)
(0.63)
(-5,+5)
-0.37
45.43**
0.18
50.22
-0.22
46.60**
0.11
53.74
(-1.47)
(-2.46)
(0.35)
(-0.69)
(-0.79)
(-2.05)
(0.89)
(1.04)
(-10,+10)
-0.10
48.17
0.19
48.65
-0.24
50.26
0.69
50.80
(-0.43)
(-1.32)
(0.48)
(-1.36)
(-0.94)
(-0.62)
(0.92)
(-0.09)
Panel B: Abnormal returns for sub-sample with positive combined wealth effect (CWE) to merging firms
Acquirer Rivals
Target Rivals
Main Customer
Dependent Customer
Number
N=220
N=223
N=191
N=188
Event Windows:
Mean
% Positive
Mean
% Positive
Mean
% Positive
Mean
% Positive
(-1,+1)
0.25**
53.64
0.38**
56.95*
0.11
49.74
0.54**
51.60
(2.46)
(0.81)
(2.43)
(1.66)
(0.73)
(-0.51)
(2.10)
(0.17)
(-2,+2)
0.54***
55.45
0.42**
56.05*
0.20
47.12
0.73**
55.85
(3.59)
(1.35)
(2.10)
(1.69)
(0.53)
(-1.23)
(2.56)
(1.34)
(-5,+5)
0.54**
54.09
0.54*
54.26
0.21
47.12
1.11***
59.04**
(2.55)
(0.94)
(1.74)
(0.86)
(0.29)
(-1.23)
(2.91)
(2.22)
(-10,+10)
1.20***
56.82*
0.86**
53.81
0.93*
54.97
2.98***
57.98**
(3.25)
(1.75)
(2.11)
(0.72)
(1.69)
(0.94)
(3.67)
(1.97)
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Panel C: Abnormal returns for sub-sample with negative combined wealth effect (CWE) to merging firms
Acquirer Rivals
Target Rivals
Main Customer
Number
N=218
N=222
N=191
Event Windows:
Mean
% Positive
Mean
% Positive
Mean
% Positive
(-1,+1)
-0.26**
44.50**
0.06
52.25
0.06
49.74
(-2.02)
(-2.14)
(-0.41)
(-0.04)
(0.91)
(-0.66)
(-2,+2)
-0.39**
44.04**
-0.06
48.65
0.02
51.83
(-2.35)
(-2.28)
(-0.86)
(-1.11)
(0.53)
(-0.08)
(-5,+5)
-1.29***
36.70***
-0.17
46.40*
-0.65
46.07*
(-4.65)
(-4.44)
(-1.11)
(-1.78)
(-1.42)
(-1.67)
(-10,+10)
-1.42***
39.45***
-0.48
43.69***
-1.40**
45.55*
(-3.88)
(-3.63)
(-1.26)
(-2.59)
(-2.27)
(-1.82)
Panel D: z statistic for the difference between positive and negative combined wealth effect sub-samples
(-1,+1)
1.93*
1.92*
0.96
0.85
-0.52
0.10
(-2,+2)
2.67***
2.40**
1.07
1.51
0.51
-0.82
(-5,+5)
3.04***
3.70***
1.08
1.65*
1.64*
0.20
(-10,+10)
3.11***
3.69***
1.47
2.09**
2.78***
1.85*

Dependent Customer
N=186
Mean
% Positive
-0.53
40.32***
(-1.52)
(-2.95)
-0.23
49.46
(-0.85)
(-0.46)
-0.89*
48.39
(-1.65)
(-0.75)
-1.63**
43.55**
(-2.38)
(-2.07)
2.19**
1.85*
2.41**
3.68***

- 56 -

1.88*
1.55
2.28**
2.18**

Table IV
Determinants of the Combined Wealth Effect to the Merging Firms
The dependent variable is the combined wealth effect (CWE) to the merging firms for the window (-10, +10) days around the period between
the first bid by the successful acquirer to the announcement of the successful bid in the contest. RDICHG is the industry-adjusted change in
R&D intensity is measured over calendar year windows (-1, +2) and (-2, +2). MKTSHACQ and MKTSHTAR are the acquirer and target market
shares in its primary industry during the year of the takeover. CONCACQ is the sales based Herfindahl Index of the four-digit SIC industry of the
acquirer during the takeover year. ACQCF is the acquirer cash flow and measured as operating income before depreciation minus interest
expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and dividends for the year prior to the takeover. ACQCF (q<1) is an interaction between acquirer cash flow
and a dummy variable that equals one when acquirer Tobin‟s q is less than one and zero otherwise. Target q>1 is a dummy variable that equals
one when target Tobin‟s q exceeds one and zero otherwise. FORCOMPACQ and FORCOMPTAR are the foreign competition in acquirer (target)
industry and calculated as the ratio of total imports divided by total supply in the industry. Relative Size is the ratio of the market value of the
target to the market value of the bidder measured fifteen days prior to the first bid by successful acquirer. Stock is a dummy which equals one
when the deal is stock financed and is zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy that equals one when the deal is reported as hostile by SDC and is
zero otherwise. MLE procedure is based on the methodology in Eckbo et al. (1990), and W represents the standard error of the manager‟s
private information. t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Dependent Variable: Combined wealth effect (CWE)
Intercept
Industry adjusted change in R&D intensity, RDICHG (years -1, +2)

WLS
0.03***
(3.03)
0.14
(1.45)

MLE
1.06***
(18.38)
0.14***
(2.66)

Industry adjusted change in R&D intensity, RDICHG (years -2, +2)
Acquirer Market Share (MKTSHACQ)
Target Market Share (MKTSHTAR)
Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index (CONCACQ)
Acquirer Cash Flow (ACQCF)
ACQCF (q<1)
Target q >1
Acquirer Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPACQ)
Target Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPTAR)
Stock Dummy (Stock)
Hostile Dummy (Hostile)
Relative Size
Standard error of manager‟s private information (W)
N
Adjusted R-Square

-0.02
(-1.16)
0.00
(-0.16)
0.03
(1.60)
-0.03
(-0.49)
-0.30
(-1.45)
-0.02***
(-2.68)
0.03
(0.85)
0.00
(0.09)
-0.02**
(-2.03)
0.06***
(3.63)
0.02***
(3.69)
453
0.11

-0.02
(-0.70)
-0.03
(-1.01)
-0.02
(-0.84)
-0.08
(-1.60)
-0.61**
(-2.48)
-0.19***
(-13.41)
0.01
(0.29)
-0.04
(-0.91)
-0.03***
(-3.11)
0.05**
(2.21)
0.02***
(7.61)
0.22***
(18.07)
453
n.a.

WLS
0.02**
(2.11)

MLE
1.05***
(17.83)

0.16*
(1.89)
-0.01
(-0.52)
0.00
(-0.05)
0.02
(1.00)
0.02
(0.42)
-0.44**
(-2.12)
-0.02***
(-2.63)
0.02
(0.60)
0.01
(0.22)
-0.02**
(-2.01)
0.05***
(2.86)
0.06***
(6.46)
-

0.16***
(3.17)
0.00
(-0.19)
-0.02
(-0.65)
-0.04
(-1.35)
-0.05
(-0.94)
-0.77***
(-2.88)
-0.19***
(-13.07)
0.00
(0.03)
-0.03
(-0.58)
-0.03***
(-2.95)
0.05*
(1.84)
0.05***
(4.56)
0.22***
(17.77)
436
n.a.

436
0.18
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Table V
WLS Regressions for abnormal returns to Acquirer and Target Rivals
The dependent variables are the abnormal return to acquirer rivals (ACQRIVCAR) and target rivals (TARRIVCAR) in
the (-10, +10) day window around the announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer. Combined wealth
effect (CWE) of a takeover is calculated as the value weighted abnormal return to the acquirer and target measured
for the window (-10, +10) days around the period between the announcement of the first bid by the successful
acquirer to the announcement of the successful bid in the contest. CONCACQ is the sales based Herfindahl Index of
the four-digit SIC industry of acquirer during the takeover year. MKTSHACQ and MKTSHTAR are the acquirer and
target market shares in its primary industry during the year of the takeover. Initial is a dummy that equals to one if
the there is no vertical takeover between the acquirer and target three-digit SIC industries in the year prior to
announcement and zero otherwise. FORCOMPACQ and FORCOMPTAR are the foreign competition in acquirer (target)
industry and calculated as the ratio of total imports divided by total supply in the industry. Stock is a dummy which
equals one when the deal is stock financed and is zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy that equals one when the deal is
reported as hostile by SDC and is zero otherwise. t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

Intercept
Combined wealth effect (CWE)
Acquirer Market Share(MKTSHACQ)

Acquirer Rival CAR
(ACQRIVCAR)

Target Rival CAR
(TARRIVCAR)

-0.005

0.001

(-1.02)

(0.20)

0.12***

0.074***

(5.52)

(3.13)

-

0.025
(1.50)

Target Market Share (MKTSHTAR)

0.012

-

(0.53)
Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index (CONCACQ)
Initial Vertical Takeover (Initial)
Acquirer Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPACQ)
Target Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPTAR)
Stock dummy (Stock)
Hostile dummy (Hostile)

0.024

-0.019

(1.21)

(-1.17)

0.002

0.014**

(0.31)

(2.34)

-0.020

-0.004

(-0.72)

(-0.17)

-0.005

-0.031

(-0.20)

(-1.23)

0.001

-0.005

(0.15)

(-0.85)

-0.023

-0.028**

(-1.56)

(-2.03)

N

438

445

Adjusted R-Square

0.05

0.04
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Table VI
WLS Regressions for abnormal returns to Main and Dependent Customers
The dependent variables are the abnormal return to main customers and the abnormal return to dependent customers
in the (-10, +10) window around the first bid by the successful acquirer. The main customer industry is identified as
the industry that accounts for the highest proportion of the total output of the downstream industry in the vertical
takeover provided it is greater than 1%. The Dependent customer industry is identified as the industry that receives
the highest proportion of its inputs from the downstream industry in vertical takeover to produce its total output,
provided it is greater than 1%. Combined wealth effect (CWE) of a takeover is calculated as the value weighted
abnormal return to the acquirer and target measured for the window of (-10, +10) days around the period between the
announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer to the announcement of the successful bid in the contest.
CONCACQ is the sales based Herfindahl Index of the four-digit SIC industry of acquirer during the takeover year.
MKTSHACQ and MKTSHTAR are the acquirer and target market shares in its primary industry during the year of the
takeover. FORCOMPACQ and FORCOMPTAR are the foreign competition in acquirer (target) industry and calculated
as the ratio of total imports divided by total supply in the industry. Stock is a dummy which equals one when the deal
is stock financed and is zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy that equals one when the deal is reported as hostile by
SDC and is zero otherwise. t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% respectively.

Intercept
Combined wealth effect (CWE)

Main Customer
CAR

Dependent Customer
CAR

-0.009*

0.003

(-1.87)

(0.36)

0.058**

0.145***

(2.23)

(4.77)

0.021

0.042**

(1.29)

(2.10)

0.007

-0.046

(0.38)

(-1.60)

Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index (CONCACQ)

0.013

-0.013

(0.65)

(-0.55)

Acquirer Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPACQ)

-0.009

-0.069*

(-0.32)

(-1.79)

-0.009

0.006

(-0.35)

(0.17)

-0.001

0.008

(-0.21)

(0.87)

0.001

-0.011

(0.04)

(-0.52)

N

382

374

Adjusted R-Square

0.01

0.07

Acquirer Market Share(MKTSHACQ)
Target Market Share (MKTSHTAR)

Target Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPTAR)
Stock dummy
Hostile dummy
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Figure 1
Schematic Diagrams for Backward and Forward Vertical Takeovers
Figure 1(a) represents a backward takeover and Figure 1(b) represents a forward takeover. A backward takeover
is one where the acquirer is downstream (customer) and the target is upstream (supplier) in the supply chain, and
a forward takeover is one where the acquirer is upstream (supplier) and the target is downstream (customer) in
the supply chain. To identify corporate customers for both forward and backward takeovers, we use industries
that buy product of the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. The direction of arrows indicates the flow
of commodities/services from a supplier to a customer.
Customer acquires Supplier

Supplier
(Target)

Target rival

Customer
(Acquirer)

Acquirer Rival

Customer Industry

Figure 1(a): Backward Takeover
Supplier acquires Customer

Supplier
(Acquirer)

Acquirer Rival

Customer
(Target)

Target Rival

Customer Industry

- 60 Figure 1(b): Forward Takeover

Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal
Capital Markets
1. Introduction
A large body of research argues that vertical boundaries of the firm are determined by
the transaction costs under different organizational forms (e.g., Coase (1937), Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979), Holmstrom and Roberts (1998),
Bolton and Scharfstein (1998)). This literature suggests that the vertically integrated form
arises in environments where contracting costs between suppliers and customers are high. In
this paper, we investigate two related research questions. First, we investigate the
determinants of the vertical boundaries of firms as measured by the degree of vertical
relatedness between business segments of the firm. Existing research examines factors that
determine the occurrence of partial equity stakes by customers in suppliers (e.g., Fee,
Hadlock, and Thomas (2006)) and the cross-country variation in vertical integration (e.g.,
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009)). We provide the first examination of industry
characteristics that lead to vertical integration in a large sample of firms operating in the
United States.
Second, we investigate how vertical relatedness between business segments affects the
working of internal capital markets. In this regard, Stein‟s (1997) „winner picking‟ hypothesis
suggests that firms operating in related lines of businesses can do a better job in the allocation
of corporate resources across divisions. We posit that the degree of vertical relatedness
between business segments captures one dimension of relatedness between firm projects. We
then investigate how our measures of vertical relatedness impact the efficiency of internal
capital allocations. We contribute to the internal capital markets literature by investigating
how product market relations between segments affect the efficiency of internal capital
allocations (e.g., see Stein (2003) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2006)).
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The extant literature on vertical integration argues that the vertical boundaries of the
firm are determined by the nature and sources of transaction costs (e.g., Coase (1937), Klein,
Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979) among others). In particular, when
contracts are incomplete, the contracting parties may take advantage of the ambiguities in
contracts and behave opportunistically in their own interests. Such opportunistic behavior
(termed as holdup) leads to underinvestment in relationship-specific investments (RSI).
Vertical integration, by providing common ownership, mitigates such contractual problems
and encourages relationship-specific investments. Based on the above, our first hypothesis is
that we should observe higher vertical relatedness between segments in environments likely to
be characterized by contractual incompleteness and relationship-specific investments.
Our second hypothesis pertains to the relation between inter-segment vertical
relatedness and efficiency of internal capital markets (ICM). In particular, in Stein‟s (1997)
model, when the corporate headquarters oversees projects in related lines of businesses, it is
able to accurately rank projects and thereby allocate capital more efficiently. Ozbas‟ (2005)
model extends this idea by showing that unrelated integration worsens the quality of
information required by the headquarters to allocate corporate resources. Khanna and Tice
(2001) provide empirical evidence that only those discount retailers who diversify into related
businesses are able to allocate capital across segments efficiently in response to a negative
shock.26 We propose that the degree of vertical relatedness between business segments
captures one dimension of relatedness between firm projects. We then hypothesize that
internal capital markets work more efficiently in the presence of significant vertical
relatedness.

26

They use the entry of Wal-Mart into the retailer‟s market as the measure for the negative shock.
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Our sample comprises of 32,554 multi-segment firm-years during the period 19842005 for which we obtain data on the Compustat industry-annual and segment databases. To
identify vertically integrated firms, we calculate the degree of vertical relatedness between the
different industries in which our sample firms have business segments. For this purpose, we
use the benchmark input-output accounts of the U.S. economy, which provide the dollar value
of commodity flows between different industries in the economy. We use this data to compute
vertical relatedness coefficients between pairs of supplier-customer industries (e.g., Fan and
Lang (2000), Shahrur (2005), and Fan and Goyal (2006) among others)). The vertical
relatedness coefficient measures the extent of commodity transfer between these industries.
We then weight the aggregate industry coefficients by the segment sales weights and
arrive at two measures of firm-level vertical relatedness, (i) the segment sales weighted
vertical relatedness coefficient between all industries in which the firm operates, and (ii) the
segment sales weighted vertical relatedness coefficient between the primary industry of the
firm and all its secondary industries. The extant literature uses vertical relatedness coefficients
of either 1% or 5% to capture economically significant vertical relatedness between business
segments within a firm (e.g., Fan and Goyal (2006) and Shenoy (2008)). Based on this
literature, we categorize a multi-segment firm as vertically integrated if the firm-level vertical
relatedness measure exceeds 5%.
To test our first hypothesis, we use two industry-level measures for environments
likely to be characterized by contractual incompleteness and relationship-specific
investments. Allen and Phillips (2000) argue that property rights are not well defined in R&D
intensive industries and likely to involve incomplete contracts. Kale and Shahrur (2007)
suggest that R&D intensive industries are likely to involve relationship-specific investments.
We, therefore, use the research and development (R&D) intensity of the primary industry of
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the firm as our first measure. The existing research also argues that strategic alliances and
joint ventures are hybrid organizational forms used as alternatives to vertical integration for
solving contractual problems (e.g., Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) and Kale and Shahrur
(2007)). Therefore, high strategic alliance/joint venture intensity between the primary industry
and vertically related supplier/customer industries is likely to indicate environments with
holdup problems. Accordingly, the second measure we use is the intensity of strategic
alliances and joint ventures involving firms in the primary industry and all vertically related
supplier/customer industries.
We then estimate probit regressions and find a higher degree of vertical relatedness
between segments when the primary industry of the firm is R&D intensive and when the
strategic alliances and joint ventures involving firms in the primary industry and vertically
related industries are more common. Both these results are supportive of our hypothesis that
vertical integration should be observed in environments likely to have high contracting costs.
Overall, the determinants of firm vertical boundaries seem to be consistent with theory.
To test our second hypothesis, we use the following three metrics developed in the
extant literature that quantify the efficiency of internal capital market (ICM) allocations: (i)
Relative Value Added by Allocation (RVA) of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), (ii) the
sensitivity of segment investment to q aggregated at the firm level (IQSENS) developed by
Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), and (iii) Relative Investment Ratio (RINV) of Rajan, Servaes,
and Zingales (2000). Intuitively, these measures capture the association between segment
investment and segment investment opportunities aggregated across all business segments of
the firm. All three measures will have a positive value in firms that systematically allocate
more investment toward segments with better investment opportunities.
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We first compare the ICM efficiency measures for firms that display significant
vertical relations to those that do not. Consistent with our expectation, firms that display
vertical relatedness of 5% or more are associated with positive and statistically significant
values of RVA, IQSENS, and RINV. Further, the difference in means between the vertical
and non-vertical sample is positive and significant at conventional levels. These results
indicate that firms with significant inter-segment vertical relations allocate capital more
efficiently within their ICMs.
To further corroborate this evidence, we conduct cross-sectional analyses of the
relation between vertical relatedness and efficiency of internal capital allocations. In this
analysis, we control for other factors that may affect the efficiency of ICMs such as the
diversity in investment opportunities, firm Herfindahl Index based on segment sales, and firm
size (e.g., Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)). These cross-sectional tests provide further
support for our hypothesis. Consistent with our second hypothesis, we find a positive
relationship between the degree of vertical relatedness and the efficiency of ICM allocations.
We also find that the interaction between diversity in investment opportunities and vertical
relatedness has a negative effect on the efficiency of internal capital allocations. This result
indicates that as the diversity in investment opportunities increases, it tends to diminish the
beneficial effects of vertical relatedness on ICMs. The positive relation between efficiency of
ICM allocations and vertical relatedness is robust to methodological controls for endogeneity.
In summary, we provide evidence which indicates that vertical integration in firms
operating in the U.S. arises in environments likely to involve high contracting costs. We also
find that in presence of significant vertical relatedness between business segments, the
segment investment flows towards segments with better investment opportunities consistent
with a well-functioning internal capital market in vertically integrated firms.
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We make the following contributions to the extant literature. First, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate determinants of inter-segment vertical
relatedness for multi-segment firms operating in the United States. We complement
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton‟s (2009) cross-country analysis in which they find a higher
incidence of vertical integration in countries with poor contract enforcement mechanisms and
more financial development. We also build upon the finding in Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas
(2006) that partial equity stakes by customers in suppliers are more likely when supplier‟s
R&D intensity is high and if the relationship is governed through a formal contractual
agreement such as joint venture or strategic alliance. In particular, we show that inter-segment
vertical relatedness arises in industries likely to have incomplete contracts and relationshipspecific investments.27
Second, we contribute to the ongoing debate in the literature regarding the efficiency
of ICM allocations. One stream of papers argues that internal capital markets are detrimental
since the corporate headquarters engages in bureaucratic decision making (e.g., Lamont
(1997), Scharfstein (1998), Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), and
Scharfstein and Stein (2000)). On the other hand, another stream suggests that internal capital
market allocations are beneficial because the corporate headquarters acts as an informed
provider of capital and directs resources towards high yield uses (e.g., Alchian (1969) and
Williamson (1975), Gertner, Scharfstein, Stein (1994), Khanna and Tice (2001), Maksimovic
and Phillips (2002), and Matsusaka and Nanda (2002)). We add to this literature by showing
that vertically integrated firms exhibit a well-functioning internal capital market.28

27

Our large sample evidence also complements prior case or industry-specific studies that examine the
determinants of vertical integration (e.g., Boerner and Macher (2001), Joskow (2005), and Lafontaine and Slade
(2007) provide excellent survey articles).
28
Yet another set of researchers argue that the evidence on inefficient cross-subsidization is an artifact of sample
selection or measurement error in Tobin‟s q (e.g., Chevalier (2004), Whited (2001), Colak and Whited (2007)).
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Finally, our paper is related to the literature which investigates how the organizational
boundaries impact the decisions undertaken by the firms‟ managers. In particular,
Mullainathan and Scharfstein (2001) find that the capacity of vertically integrated chemical
producers is less responsive to market conditions than the capacity of non-integrated
producers. Guedj (2006) compares integrated projects to projects governed via contracts
within pharmaceutical firms and finds that only upon ownership of the project does the firm
enjoy benefits of internal capital markets.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data
sources, sample selection, empirical methodology for computing firm-level vertical
relatedness, and characteristics of our sample. In Section 3, we present a discussion of the
determinants of firm vertical boundaries and the results based on probit estimations. In
Section 4, we present a discussion of the possible relation between vertical relatedness and
ICM efficiency measures based on the extant theoretical literature followed by our univariate
and multivariate analysis of this relation. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5.
2. Data Sources, Sample Selection, Methodology for Vertical Relatedness and
Descriptive Statistics
2.1. Data Sources and Sample Selection
We obtain segment data from the Compustat segment tapes and firm level financial
information from Compustat Industrial Annual database for all active and inactive firms
during the period 1984-2005.

For each segment, we collect data on net sales, capital

expenditure, total assets, and SIC codes. We exclude segments that do not contain complete
information on these variables. We also eliminate firm-years with missing firm assets or sales,
where the sum of segment sales is not within 5% of the total firm sales, where the sum of
segment sales is less than $20 million, and where any segment has a one-digit SIC code of six
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(financial industry). The above sample selection criteria are largely consistent with the
corporate diversification literature (e.g., Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004)). The
sample based on above criteria leads us to a sample of 32,554 multi-segment and 64,045
single segment firm-years.
2.2. Firm Level Measures of Vertical Relatedness
To compute measures for vertical relatedness, we rely on the benchmark input-output
accounts of the U.S. economy. This data is published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis
every five years for the aggregate industries of the U.S. economy. Specifically, the Use Table
from the benchmark accounts provides a matrix of commodity flows between different pairs
of input-output (IO) industries. For example, for a given IO industry „i‟, we can obtain the
dollar amount of commodity flow from IO industry „j‟ required to produce the total output of
industry „i‟. A number of papers in the finance literature have used this data to measure
vertical relations between industries (e.g., Fan and Lang (2000), Fan and Goyal (2006),
Shahrur (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2009), and Shenoy (2008)).
We build upon the extant literature and compute the following two measures for firm
level vertical relatedness: (i) A measure that captures the extent of inter-segment vertical
relatedness between all business segments of a multi-segment firm, and (ii) A measure that
captures the extent to which the primary segment of the firm is vertically related to all
secondary segments of the firm. We also compute separate measures for the extent of
backward and forward vertical relatedness.
We compute our first set of measures (VrcBackCoeff1, VrcForwCoeff1) for backward
and forward vertical relatedness based on Acemoglu et al. (2009) as follows. First, we use the
segment data to identify all four-digit SIC industries in which a firm operates. We also obtain
the segment sales, assets, and capital expenditures. Then, we find for each dollar of output of
- 68 -

industry „i‟ in which the firm operates, the dollar amount of inputs required from all other
industries „j‟ in which the firm has business segments, where j does not equal „i‟. We denote
each of these coefficients as 𝜃𝑖𝑗 . The summation of these coefficients, 𝜃𝑖 =
𝑛
𝑗 =1,𝑗 ≠𝑖

𝜃𝑖𝑗 represents per dollar of output of industry „i‟, the dollar amount of inputs from all

other industries „j‟ in which the firm operates. We then compute the firm level backward
vertical relatedness coefficient (VrcBackCoeff1) by weighting each 𝜃𝑖 by the sales weight of
the segment, i.e., 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓1 =

𝑛
𝑖=1 𝜃𝑖

∗ 𝑤𝑖 where wi is the sales of segment „i‟ divided

by the sales of all segments of the firm. The firm level vertical relatedness coefficient
(VrcBackCoeff1) measures the opportunity for backward vertical integration between all
segments of the firm.
We compute a similar measure based on forward vertical relatedness between
segments. We find for each dollar of output of industry „i‟ in which the firm operates, the
dollar amount of output sold to all other industries „j‟ in which the firm has business
segments, where j does not equal to „i‟. We denote each of these coefficients as 𝛼𝑖𝑗 . The
summation of these coefficients 𝛼𝑖 =

𝑛
𝑗 =1,𝑗 ≠𝑖

𝛼𝑖𝑗 represents per dollar of output of industry

„i‟, the dollar amount sold to all other industries in which the firm operates. We then compute
the firm level forward vertical relatedness coefficient (VrcForwCoeff1) by weighting each 𝛼𝑖
by the sales weight of the segment, i.e. 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓1 =

𝑛
𝑖=1 𝛼𝑖

∗ 𝑤𝑖 where wi is the sales

of segment „i‟ divided by the sales of all segments of the firm. The firm level vertical
relatedness coefficient (VrcForwCoeff1) measures the opportunity for forward vertical
integration between all segments of the firm.
The second measure of vertical relatedness is based on Fan and Lang (2000). Here, the
focus is to measure how the primary segment of the firm is vertically related to its secondary
segments. For each firm-year observation, we identify the primary segment as the segment
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with the largest sales and denote its corresponding industry as „i‟, and all remaining segments
as secondary, and their corresponding industries as „j‟ for j=1 to n-1.
We then find the dollar amount of inputs from the secondary industry „j‟ required to
produce a dollar of the primary industry „i‟ total output (  ji ). Subsequently, we find the dollar
flow from the primary industry „i‟ required to produce a dollar of secondary industry „j‟ total
1

output (  ij ). We then find 𝑉𝑖𝑗 ,𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇 = 2 × 𝛾𝑗𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗 , which gives measure for the
opportunity for backward integration between primary industry „i‟ and secondary industry „j‟.
Finally, the firm-level measure of backward vertical relatedness is computed as the sales
weighted vertical relatedness between the primary industry „i‟ and all secondary industries „j‟
and calculated as 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓2 =

𝑗

𝑉𝑖𝑗 ,𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇 ∗ 𝑤𝑗 where wj is the sales weight of the

secondary segment „j‟ to the sum of sales of all secondary segments of the firm.
𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓2 measures the opportunity for backward vertical integration between the
primary segment and all secondary segments of the firm.
We also compute a similar measure to capture the extent of forward integration
between the primary industry „i‟ and each secondary industry „j‟. Specifically, we find for
every dollar of output of the primary industry „i‟ the amount transferred to each secondary
industry „j‟ (  ij ) and for every dollar of output of the secondary industry „j‟ the dollar amount
transferred to the primary industry „i‟ (  ji ). We then find the extent of output transfers
1

between primary industry „i‟ and each secondary industry „j‟ as 𝑉𝑖𝑗 ,𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇 = 2 × 𝜂𝑗𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗 .
Finally, the firm-level measure of forward vertical relatedness is the sales weighted vertical
relatedness between the primary industry „i‟ and all secondary industries „j‟ and calculated as
𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓2 =

𝑗

𝑉𝑖𝑗 ,𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇 ∗ 𝑤𝑗 where wj is the sales weight of the secondary

segment „j‟ to the sum of all secondary segment sales. 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓2 measures the
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opportunity for forward vertical integration between the primary segment and all secondary
segments of the firm.29
The benchmark input-output data uses a different system of industry definitions than
those from the SIC industry definitions. We, therefore, use the SIC-IO concordance table of
Fan and Lang (2000) to map the four-digit segment SIC codes to their respective six-digit
input-output (IO) codes. We employ the Use tables of 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 for firmyear observations during 1984 to 1985, 1986 to 1990, 1991 to 1997, and 1998 to 2005
respectively. The use of different input-output tables over our sample period is motivated by
the likelihood that the input-output relations between industries may change over time.
Furthermore, the 1997 benchmark input-output accounts incorporate the NAICS system
instead of the SIC system of industry classification. To use the 1997 benchmark input-output
tables, we first map the four-digit SIC codes of the segments to their respective six-digit
NAICS codes using the Bridge tables provided by the Bureau of Census. We then find their
respective IO industries using the NAICS-IO concordance table provided in the 1997
benchmark input-output accounts.
2.3. Descriptive Statistics on the Sample of Multi-Segment and Single-Segment Firms
In Panel A of Table I, we present the summary statistics of the multi-segment and
single segment firms in our sample. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile
levels to reduce the effect of outliers on the results. We find that multi-segment firms are
larger than single segment firms in terms of assets and sales, have a higher profitability than
single segment firms (EBIT), have a lower R&D intensity than single segment firms, are more
likely to be listed on a major exchange, are more likely to be incorporated outside the U.S.,
are more likely to be part of the S&P index, are more likely to pay dividends, and belong to
29

We also compute the vertical relatedness coefficient using segment asset based weights instead of segment
sales based weights and obtain qualitatively similar results.
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industries where a larger percentage of firms are diversified and where diversified firms
account for a larger share of the market share. In unreported results, we find that the
difference in means between the multi-segment and single-segment samples for all above
attributes is statistically significant at the 1% level. In summary, we find that the
characteristics of multi-segment firms are substantially different from those of single segment
firms.
In Panel B of Table I, we provide descriptive statistics on our measures of vertical
relatedness for multi-segment firms. In particular, the opportunity for backward (forward)
vertical integration between all business segments of multi-segment firms in our sample,
VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1), is on average, 2.81% (2.15%). Further, the opportunity for
backward (forward) vertical integration between the primary industry of the firm and all
secondary industries in which the firm operates, VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2), is on
average, 1.26% (1.36%). Furthermore, primary segments on average account for 66% of
multi-segment firm sales (CORESIZE). Secondary segments account for the remaining 34%
of multi-segment firm sales. This finding indicates that secondary segments represent a
significant percentage of the total sales (assets) of multi-segment firms.
The literature has used a vertical relatedness cutoff of either 1% or 5% to capture
economically significant vertical relations (e.g., Fan and Goyal (2006) and Shenoy (2008)). In
unreported results, we find that 4,455 (3,544) firm-years have significant backward (forward)
inter-segment vertical relatedness between all segments based on VrcBackCoeff1
(VrcForwCoeff1) of 5% or greater. Similarly, we also find that 2,220 (2,295) firm-years have
significant backward (forward) vertical relatedness between the primary segment and all
secondary segments based on VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) of 5% or greater. In summary,
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we find that a significant proportion of multi-segment firms display economically meaningful
backward and forward vertical relatedness between their business segments.
3. Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries
In this section, we make predictions regarding the different economic forces that can
impact the vertical boundaries of firms. We then outline our empirical methodology and
present and discuss our results based on probit estimations.
3.1. Variables to Capture Determinants of Vertical Boundaries of the Firm
The existing literature on vertical integration argues that in presence of contractual
incompleteness trading partners are reluctant to make relationship-specific investments
fearing future contractual bargaining problems (e.g., Coase (1937), Klein, Crawford, and
Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979)). This leads to underinvestment in relationshipspecific investments. Vertical integration, by providing common ownership, mitigates this
underinvestment problem and provides incentives to make relationship-specific investments.
Based on the above, we hypothesize that the vertically integrated form should be observed in
environments likely to involve relationship-specific investments and where contracts are
likely to be incomplete.
In contrast to the efficiency argument outlined above, an alternate stream of literature
suggests that vertical integration is anti-competitive in nature. This literature proposes two
possible routes through which vertical integration can enhance market power, namely,
foreclosure, where vertical integration gives the integrated firm an unfair advantage over its
non-integrated rivals, and collusion, where the vertical integration enhances co-ordination
with the non-integrated rivals (e.g., Shenoy (2008)). In the determinants section, we also
investigate these anti-competitive strategies of vertical integration. We propose the following
variables for the determinants of vertical integration.
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(i) R&D intensity of the primary segment‟s four-digit SIC industry measured as R&D
expenditure divided by net sales (INDRDI). Allen and Phillips (2000) argue that property
rights are not well defined R&D intensive industries and, therefore, are likely to have
contracting problems. Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) find that equity stakes in suppliercustomer relationships are more common in R&D intensive environments. Kale and Shahrur
(2007) use industry R&D intensity to measure relationship-specific investments. Based on the
above, we use R&D intensity as the first proxy for incomplete contracts and for the
prevalence of relationship-specific investments. We predict a positive relation between intersegment vertical relatedness and R&D intensity of the primary industry, i.e., a positive sign
on INDRDI.
(ii) Strategic alliance/joint venture intensity measured as the number of joint ventures and
strategic alliances between firms in the primary industry and firms in all secondary industries
that are vertically related at the 1% level divided by the number of firms in the primary
industry of the firm (SAJVINT).30 This acts as our second proxy for contractual
incompleteness and prevalence of relationship-specific investments. Kale and Shahrur (2007)
argue that industries in which strategic alliances and joint ventures with firms in supplier and
customer industries are prevalent are likely to involve contractual frictions. Fee, Hadlock, and
Thomas (2006) find that equity stakes by customers in their suppliers are more common if the
relationship was governed by formal alliance agreements. They argue that equity stakes and
explicit alliance agreements are complements and can both be used to resolve holdup
problems. Based on this, we conjecture a positive relation between the degree of vertical

30

As robustness, we measure SAJVINT based on a 5% cutoff for identifying vertically related industries. We find
similar results under this approach.
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relatedness between segments and the strategic alliance and joint venture intensity, i.e., a
positive sign on SAJVINT.31
(iii) Advertising intensity of the primary segment four-digit SIC industry measured as the
advertising expenditure divided by net sales (INDADV). Prior literature suggests that
investments in brand name represent relationship-specific investing (e.g., Gatignon and
Anderson (1988)). It is likely that advertising spending represents investments towards brand
capital. Therefore, in industries with high advertising intensity there is likely to be more
relationship-specific investing as measured by investment in brand name. Accordingly, we
posit that the higher the industry advertising intensity, the greater is the likelihood to observe
vertical integration, i.e. a positive sign on INDADV.32
(iv) Selling, general, and administrative expenditure intensity of the primary segment fourdigit SIC industry measured as the selling, general, and administrative expenditure divided by
net sales (INDSELL). If a firm‟s segments are vertically related it is likely that the firm would
spend less on transmitting information about its product to prospective buyers/suppliers since
part of the output produced by some of its segments is potentially being used internally by
other vertically related segments. If vertical integrating into related industries helps the firm to
economize on costs of transmitting information, it is likely that vertically integrated firms
would be observed in industries with less selling, general, and administrative expenditure
intensity. Consistent with this argument, the extant literature documents a negative
relationship between vertical relatedness and selling, general, and administrative expenditure
(e.g., Caves and Bradburd (1988)). Based on the above, we posit a negative relation between

31

The alliance/joint venture data is obtained from SDC Platinum database.
In line with our hypothesis, prior research documents a positive relation between firm advertising intensity and
vertical integration (e.g., Levy (1985), Boerner and Macher (2001), Lafontaine and Shaw (2005), and Nickerson
and Silverman (2003)).
32
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vertical relatedness and industry selling, general, and administrative expenditure intensity,
i.e., a negative sign on INDSELL.
(v) Sales based Herfindahl index of the primary industry (INDHERF). This choice is based
on anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration such as collusion (e.g., Chen (2001) and
Nocke and White (2007)). In these models, when an industry is already concentrated, a
vertical takeover with a firm in the supplier/customer industry increases the likelihood of
collusion between the integrated firm and non-integrated rivals by facilitating a mechanism
that aids the flow of information between the integrated firm and non-integrated rivals.
Accordingly, if the motivation behind vertical integration was collusion, we posit a positive
relation between vertical relatedness and primary industry concentration, i.e., a positive sign
on INDHERF.
(vi) Market shares of the firm in its primary and secondary industries (PRIMSEGMKTSH and
SECSEGMKTSH). The extant literature proposes foreclosure as yet another anti-competitive
rationale for vertical integration (e.g., Salinger (1988), Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990),
Hart and Tirole (1990) among others). Under this hypothesis, vertical integration provides an
opportunity for integrated firms to raise the costs of their non-integrated rivals by denying or
limiting access to inputs or distribution outlets to their rivals. It is likely that the higher the
market share of the integrated firm in its primary/secondary industries, the greater is its
market power to foreclose its non-integrated rivals. Accordingly, if the motivation behind
vertical integration was foreclosure, we expect a positive relation between vertical relatedness
and the market shares of the firm in its primary/secondary industries, i.e., a positive sign on
PRIMSEGMKTSH and SECSEGMKTSH.33

33

A multi-segment firm can have multiple secondary segments. We compute the market share of each of a firm‟s
secondary segment industries, and then value weight these market shares with segment sales weights to arrive at
SECSEGMKTSH.
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(vii) Interaction term between proxies for contracting difficulties and industry shocks. Klein
(1996) and Klein and Murphy (1997) argue that the likelihood of contractual hazards is
magnified in presence of relationship-specific investments when market conditions change
sufficiently to place the relationship outside the self-enforcing range of contracts. Consistent
with this argument, Fan (2000) finds that an increase in price uncertainty in the petrochemical
industry makes vertical integration more desirable to govern relationship-specific
transactions. Accordingly, we posit that the interaction between our proxies that capture
relationship-specific assets and an industry shock variable would also be a determinant of
vertical integration. As a proxy for the industry shock, we calculate the one-year sales growth
of the primary industry of the firm (SALGROWTH). We then interact SALGROWTH with
INDRDI and SAJVINT, our two main variables that capture the likelihood of contracting
problems, and posit that both the interaction terms would have a positive sign.
3.2. Estimation Methodology
We now outline the empirical methodology employed to investigate the determinants
of vertical relatedness between firm segments. We create dummy variables VrcBackDum1,
VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2 to measure significant vertical
relatedness. Specifically, the dummy variable, VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) equals one if
VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1) is 5% or greater, and is zero otherwise. Similarly,
VrcBackDum2 (VrcForwDum2) equals one if VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) is 5% or
greater, and is zero otherwise. VrcBackDum1 and VrcForwDum1 capture the extent of
backward and forward relatedness between all business segments of multi-segment firms. On
the other hand, VrcBackDum2 and VrcForwDum2 capture the extent of backward and forward
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relatedness between the primary segment and all secondary segments of the firm. 34 We then
estimate probit regressions to investigate how these vertical relatedness dummies are related
to the determinants of vertical integration as proposed above.
3.3. Results for the Determinants of Vertical Relatedness across all Segments
In Table II, we provide results based on probit estimation for the determinants of
vertical relatedness between all segments of multi-segment firms. As highlighted earlier, the
binary dependent variable VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) measures backward (forward)
vertical relatedness between all segments of a multi-segment firm. In Models 1 and 2, we
include as explanatory variables industry R&D intensity (INDRDI), strategic alliance and
joint venture intensity (SAJVINT), industry advertising expenditure intensity (INDADV),
industry selling, general, and administrative expenditure intensity (INDSELL), industry
Herfindahl Index (INDHERF), and market shares of the firm in its primary and secondary
industry (PRIMSEGMKTSH and SECSEGMKTSH). We also include firm size (FIRMSIZE) as
an additional control variable. All specifications have calendar year dummies and the reported
p-values are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are clustered by firm.
As hypothesized, we find a positive relation between the R&D intensity of the firm‟s
primary industry (INDRDI) and vertical relatedness between all segments (VrcBackDum1 and
VrcForwDum1) in all our four specifications. This indicates that vertical relatedness between
business segments is more likely when the firm‟s primary industry is R&D intensive. Further,
we find that the coefficient on SAJVINT is positive and significant at the 1% level in all four
specifications. This indicates that inter-segment vertical relatedness is observed in a firm
when strategic alliances and joint ventures between the primary industry and all vertically

34

As a robustness check, we use continuous measures of vertical relatedness (VrcBackCoeff1, VrcForwCoeff1,
VrcBackCoeff2, and VrcForwCoeff2) instead of dummy variables. The results under this approach are
qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
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related industries are more prevalent. Overall, both these results show that inter-segment
vertical relatedness is observed in environments likely to have costly contracting.
We find that INDADV is positively related to the vertical relatedness in all four
specifications; however, the results are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The
positive sign on INDADV is in the hypothesized direction but the results lack statistical power.
The coefficient on INDSELL is negative and significant at the 1% level in all four
specifications. A vertically integrated firm, by using part of its outputs internally, is likely to
spend less on transmitting information about its product to prospective buyers/suppliers. If
this is true, we should observe vertically integrated firms in industries with less selling,
general, and administrative expenditure intensity. The negative sign on INDSELL is consistent
with the above argument.
The coefficient on INDHERF is insignificant in all specifications, which indicates that
the vertical integration is unlikely to be motivated by an attempt to promote collusion with
non-integrated rivals. The coefficient on PRIMSEGMKTSH is found to be negative and
significant in all four specifications. The negative sign is directly opposite to the prediction
under the foreclosure hypothesis. Further, inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis, the
coefficient on SECSEGMKTSH is found to be statistically insignificant. Overall, our proxies
to capture anti-competitive intent of vertical integration behave in a manner inconsistent with
these hypotheses. The extant literature on mergers and acquisitions and other industry and
case studies generally find that vertical integration is unlikely to be motivated by anticompetitive strategies such as foreclosure and collusion (e.g., Eckbo (1983), Hortaçsu and
Syverson (2007), and Shenoy (2008) among others).

Our evidence complements this

literature by showing more generally that vertical integration decisions undertaken by
managers do not seem to be motivated by anti-competitive strategies.
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In Models 3 and 4, we include all explanatory variables included in Models 1 and 2
along with the two interaction terms SAJVINT*SALGROWTH and INDRDI*SALGROWTH.
We have argued that the potential for holdup is magnified in presence of relationship-specific
investments when market conditions change sufficiently. We find support for this hypothesis
in some specifications. In particular, in Model 3, we find that the coefficient on
INDRDI*SALGROWTH is positive and significant. Further, in Model 4, we find that the
coefficient on SAJVINT*SALGROWTH is positive and significant. The signs on all other
explanatory variables are in the same direction as those obtained in Models 1 and 2. The
results from Models 3 and 4 provide partial support for the view presented by Klein (1996)
and Klein and Murphy (1997) that in presence of relationship-specific investments, significant
changes in the market conditions as proxied by the primary industry sales growth increases
the likelihood of vertical integration.
3.4. Results for the Determinants of Vertical Relatedness between Primary Segment and all
Secondary Segments of the Firm
In Table III, we provide results based on probit estimation for the determinants of firm
vertical relatedness as measured by the vertical relatedness between the primary segment and
all secondary segments of the firm. The dependent variable is a binary variable
VertBackDum2 (VertForwDum2) that equals 1 when the backward (forward) vertical
relatedness coefficient VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise.
In line with the findings in Table II, we find a positive association between the R&D
intensity of the firm‟s primary industry (INDRDI) and vertical relatedness between the
primary segment and all secondary segments of the firm in all four specifications.
Furthermore, we find a positive relationship between SAJVINT and vertical relatedness
between the primary segment and all secondary segments of the firm.
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We find that INDADV is positively related only to VrcForwDum2 in Models 2 and 4.
If industry advertising expenditures capture the extent of asset specificity, this result supports
the view that vertical integration is observed in environments likely to involve relationshipspecific investments. The relationship between INDADV and VrcBackDum2 is however found
to be insignificant. Therefore, overall we obtain mixed results based on INDADV. The
coefficient on INDSELL is negative and significant at the 1% level in all four specifications,
which is consistent with our argument that vertical integration helps firms to economize on
costs of transmitting information.
Finally, the coefficient on INDHERF is insignificant in all specifications, the
coefficient on PRIMSEGMKTSH is found to be negative and significant, and the coefficient
on SECSEGMKTSH is found to be statistically insignificant. In Model 3, we find that the
coefficient on INDRDI*SALGROWTH and SAJVINT*SALGROWTH are positive and
significant. However, in Model4, we find that both the interactive terms are positive but
insignificant. The signs on all other explanatory variables are in the same direction as those
obtained in Models 1 and 2.
In summary, we investigate the determinants of vertical relatedness between business
segments of a firm as measured by (i) Vertical relatedness between all segments of the firm
and (ii) Vertical relatedness between the primary segment and all secondary segments of the
firm. Using both measures, we find consistent support for the view that the degree of vertical
relatedness between business segments of firms is higher in environments likely to be plagued
by contractual incompleteness and where relationship-specific investments are prevalent.
Furthermore, inter-segment vertical relatedness does not seem to be motivated by anticompetitive rationales such as foreclosure or collusion.
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4. Vertical Relatedness and its Impact on Internal Capital Markets
In this section, we first discuss the different measures that capture internal capital
market efficiency as proposed in the extant literature. We then outline our empirical
methodology to investigate the relation between vertical relatedness and ICM efficiency.
Subsequently, we perform both univariate analysis and multivariate analyses (based on OLS,
Heckman, and 2SLS estimations) to investigate how vertical relatedness between business
segments affects the internal capital market allocations.
4.1. Measures for Efficiency of Internal Capital Market Allocations
We use the following measures developed in the extant literature to capture the
efficiency of internal capital market allocations, Relative Value Added by Allocation (RVA)
of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), the Investment-Q sensitivity aggregated over all
business segments of a firm (IQSENS) developed by Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), and
Relative Investment Ratio (RINV) developed by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000). These
measures capture the association between segment investment and segment investment
opportunities aggregated across all business segments of multi-segment firms.
Our first measure Relative Value Added by Allocation (RVA) is computed as follows.
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In equation (1), wj is the fraction of total firm assets that belong to segment „j‟, Ij is the
capital expenditure of segment „j‟ obtained from Compustat segment tapes, Aj is the book
value of segment „j‟ assets, qj is the imputed q for segment „j‟ and measured as the median
Tobin‟s q for single-segment firms matched on the narrowest SIC industry (four-digit, threedigit, or two-digit SIC) that includes at least five single-segment firms, q is the asset-
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I
weighted imputed q across all segments of the firm, and 
A


SS


 is the asset-weighted ratio of

i

capital-expenditure to book value of assets for single-segment firms in industry „i‟, matched
on the narrowest SIC industry (four-digit, three-digit, or two-digit SIC) that includes at least
five single-segment firms.
As a proxy for the transfer related to a segment „j‟, Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales
ss
ss
n  Ii  I  
I
(2000) use the industry-adjusted   and firm-adjusted  wi      investment ratio
i 1  Ai  A i 
 A j



for that segment. If transfer for a segment „j‟ is positive then the segment is a net receiver,
and, if negative, the segment is a net provider of funds.
Since segments are not publicly traded entities the literature has typically used
imputed q as a proxy for segment investment opportunities. Consistent with this literature, we
calculate imputed q for a segment as the median Tobin‟s q of single-segment firms in the
four-digit, three-digit, or two-digit SIC industry of the segment that includes at least five
single-segment firms. If the internal capital allocations are efficient, segments with high
investment opportunities (imputed q greater than q ) would be receivers of funds, whereas
segments with low investment opportunities (imputed q less than q ) would be providers of
funds. This would lead RVA to be positive. Finally, the magnitude of RVA gives the overall
value added (subtracted) by the internal allocation policy of diversified firms.
The second measure IQSENS is a variant of the RVA measure and is computed below
in equation (2). In Equation (2), wj is the fraction of total firm assets that belong to segment j,
qj is the imputed q for segment j and calculated as the median Tobin‟s q for single-segment
firms matched on the narrowest SIC industry (four-digit, three-digit, or two-digit SIC) that
includes at least five single-segment firms, q is the asset-weighted imputed q across all
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segments of the firm, Ij is the capital expenditure of segment „j‟, Aj is the book value of
n

segment j assets, and

Ii

w * A
i 1

i

is the firm capital expenditure calculated as the asset-
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weighted capital expenditure to asset ratio across all segments of the firm.
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a measure of the extent of transfer of capital for a segment. It

provides the jth segment‟s capital expenditure to asset ratio minus the asset-weighted capital
expenditure to asset ratio for all segments in the firm. Segments with positive values of this
variable can be interpreted as net “receivers” of funds, whereas segments with negative values
represent net “providers” of funds. Similarly, ( q j  q ) measures the difference between the
imputed q for the jth segment and the asset-weighted imputed q of all segments in the firm.
Overall, IQSENS will be positive if high q segments (segments with imputed q above q ) are
net receivers of funds and low q segments (segments with imputed q below q ) are net
providers of funds. Therefore, positive values for IQSENS indicate efficient internal capital
market allocations since investment flows towards segments with better investment
opportunities.
The final efficiency measure RINV was developed by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales
(2000) and is given below in equation (3). Here, for j=1 to k segments, the imputed q is
greater than the asset-weighted imputed q measured across „n‟ segments of the firm, and for
j=k-n+1 to n segments that imputed q is less than the asset-weighted imputed q across „n‟
segments of the firm. If the firm invests more in segments where imputed q is greater than
asset-weighted imputed q of firm than in segments where imputed q is less than asset- 84 -

weighted imputed q of firm it would lead to positive values of RINV which indicates efficient
internal capital market allocations.
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4.2. Relation between Vertical Relatedness and Internal Capital Market Allocations
We have argued that the degree of vertical relatedness between business segments of
firms measures the extent of relatedness in firm projects. Based on Stein (1997), we
hypothesize that the higher the degree of vertical relatedness, the greater is the efficiency of
internal capital market allocations. To test this hypothesis, we regress measures that capture
the efficiency of the internal capital market given in equations (1), (2), and (3) on the degree
of vertical relatedness and other control variables known to affect internal capital market
allocations. We propose the following regression models given by equations (4)-(6).
𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4
∗ 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡

4

𝐼𝑄𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡

(5)

𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4
∗ 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡

(6)

The dependent variable is one of the measures of efficiency as outlined in section 4.1.
VrcBackDum1 is a dummy that equals one when the sales-weighted backward vertical
relatedness coefficient VrcBackCoeff1 exceeds 5% and zero otherwise. We also estimate
specifications using VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2 as alternative
measures for vertical relatedness. The benefit of using indicator variables is that it enables us
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to compare the investment behavior of vertically integrated firms vs. those that are not.35 The
control variables are based on Rajan et al. (2000) and outlined as follows: DIVERSITY is the
diversity in investment opportunities, VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY is the interaction between
vertical relatedness and diversity, FIRMSIZE is firm size measured as the logarithm of the
firm‟s net sales, and HERFSAL is the sales-based Herfindahl Index of the firm.
DIVERSITY is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm‟s asset-weighted
segment imputed q‟s divided by the equally weighted average imputed q (see equation (7)). In
this equation, qj is the imputed q for segment „j‟ and is calculated as the median Tobin‟s q for
single-segment firms matched on the four digit, three digit, or two digit SIC codes, wj is the


asset-weight of segment „j‟, and wq is the asset-weighted imputed q across all segments of the
firm. In Table I, we show that the average value of DIVERSITY is 0.30 which is similar to the
values in Rajan et al. (2000).
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Under Stein‟s winner-picking hypothesis, we expect a positive effect of vertical
relatedness on the ICM efficiency. Accordingly, we would observe a positive sign on α1, β1,
and γ1. Rajan et al. (2000) argue that diversity in investment opportunities (DIVERSITY)
increases the managerial rent seeking behavior and distorts investment towards segments with
relatively lower investment opportunities. Consistent with their argument, we expect a
35

We perform the following robustness checks. First, we replicate the ICM efficiency regressions using
continuous vertical relatedness variables (see Footnote 11 for details). Second, instead of using separate
specifications for backward and forward relatedness we consolidate them into the following dummies;
HIGHHIGH which is one for firms with high backward and forward relatedness, and HIGHLOW is one for firms
with high (low) backward and low (high) forward relatedness. We find that HIGHHIGH is positive and
significant in all specifications. HIGHLOW is positive but is statistically significant in some specifications.
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negative relation between diversity and internal capital market efficiency measure (α2<0,
β2<0, and γ2<0). Further, for a vertically integrated firm, as the diversity in investment
opportunities increases there is greater rent-seeking behavior by divisional managers which
negatively impacts the allocating efficiency. Therefore, we expect a negative sign on the
interaction term between the diversity in investment opportunities and vertical relatedness
(α3<0, β3<0, and γ3<0). Finally, the extant literature has used segment sales-based Herfindahl
index as a proxy for firm focus and argued that firm focus improves allocative efficiency of
internal capital markets (e.g., Rajan et al. (2000)). Further, Stein (1997) predicts that internal
capital market allocations are efficient when the headquarters oversees a small set of projects.
Based on the above, we expect a positive relation between HERFSAL, and the efficiency of
internal capital markets (α4>0, β4>0, and γ4>0).
4.3. Univariate Results
In this section, we present and discuss our univariate results on the internal capital
market efficiency measures. Specifically, we investigate how internal capital market
efficiency measures (RVA, IQSENS, and RINV) vary in sub-samples of firms that exhibit
significant vertical relatedness and those that do not.
In Panel A of Table IV, we provide results for our overall sample of 32,552 multisegment firm-years. For the overall sample, we find that the average values of RVA and RINV
are negative, whereas that for IQSENS is positive. However, the average values for all three
measures for the overall sample are found to be statistically insignificant. This indicates that
for the overall sample of firms no value is added by internal capital allocations. We then
segregate our sample of multi-segment firm-years into those that display significant vertical
relations and those that do not. We expect to observe higher internal capital market efficiency
in the sub-sample of firms that display significant vertical relatedness.
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In Panel B, we provide results for sub-samples based on cutoffs of the backward
vertical relatedness coefficient VrcBackCoeff1 and VrcBackCoeff2. For the sub-sample of
firms that have VrcBackCoeff1 greater than or equal 5%, we find that the average values of
RVA, IQSENS, and RINV are 0.00012, 0.00035, and 0.00058, respectively. These are
statistically significant at conventional levels. On the other hand, in the sub-sample of firms
with VrcBackCoeff1 less than 5%, the corresponding values are -0.00008, 0.00022, and 0.00025, respectively and are also found to be statistically significant. The difference in mean
for the above and below cutoff samples is statistically significant at least at the 10% level. We
also provide results based on sub-samples based on VrcBackCoeff2 values of above and below
5%. Here also, we find that the difference in means between the two sub-samples is
statistically significant at least at the 5% level.
In Panel C, we provide results for sub-samples based on cutoffs of the forward vertical
relatedness coefficient, VrcForwCoeff1 and VrcForwCoeff2. In the sub-sample of firms where
VrcForwCoeff2 is greater than or equal 5%, we find that the average values of RVA, IQSENS,
and RINV are 0.00027, 0.00048, and 0.00081, respectively. These are statistically significant
at least at the 10% level. For the sub-sample of firms below the 5% vertical relatedness cutoff,
the average values are -0.00009, 0.00021, and -0.00025, respectively and are also found to be
statistically significant. We also observe that the difference in means for the above and below
cutoff samples is statistically significant at least at the 1% level. Qualitatively similar results
are found when the sub-samples are based on a forward vertical relatedness coefficient
VrcForwCoeff2 cutoff of 5%.
Overall, in this section, we document the following findings. In the sub-sample of
firms that display significant vertical relations, we find that the average values for RVA,
IQSENS, and RINV are positive and significant. Furthermore, the difference in means between
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the sub-samples of firms with high and low vertical relatedness is significant. This
preliminary evidence shows that (i) vertically related firms systematically allocate investment
towards segments with better investment opportunities reflecting in positive values of
efficiency measures, and (ii) vertically related firms exhibit a higher efficiency of internal
capital allocations than non-vertically related firms.
4.4. OLS Estimation
In Table V, we present the results from OLS estimation of Equations (4), (5), and (6)
to investigate the relation between inter-segment vertical relatedness and internal capital
market allocations. In Panel A, we report results based on vertical relatedness dummies
VrcBackDum1 and VrcForwDum1, which measure vertical relations across all segments of
the firm. In Panel B, we report results with vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum2 and
VrcForwDum2, which measure vertical relations between the primary segment and all
secondary segments of the firm. All OLS and subsequent estimations in Sections 4.5 to 4.7
contain calendar-year dummies and the reported p-values are based on heteroskedasticity
robust standard errors and clustered by firm.
In Panel A, we observe that the coefficient on the vertical relatedness measures
(VrcBackDum1 and VrcForwDum1) is positive and statistically significant at conventional
levels in all specifications. A similar positive relation is found between vertical relatedness
measures (VrcBackDum2 and VrcForwDum2) and internal capital market efficiency measures
in Panel B. These results are consistent with our expectation that vertical relatedness between
business segments of the firm improves the allocative efficiency of internal capital markets.
The
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VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY) is negative and significant in most specifications. This indicates
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that as the diversity in investment opportunities increases, the beneficial effect of vertical
relatedness on the efficiency of internal capital market allocations is reduced. Further, the
coefficient on the sales-based Herfindahl Index of the firm (HERFSAL) is positive and
statistically significant at the 1% level in Panel A and B. The positive sign suggests that as the
multi-segment firm becomes more focused, it displays higher efficiency in internal capital
market allocations. Finally, we document a negative but statistically insignificant relation
between diversity in investment opportunities (DIVERSITY) and the internal capital market
efficiency measures.
4.5. Heckman Model Estimation
In this section, we control for the endogeneity of the firms‟ decision to diversify by
adopting the Heckman‟s two stage model. In the first stage of the Heckman methodology,
called the selection equation, we pool the multi-segment and single segment observations and
estimate a probit regression to model the decision to diversify. We then obtain the Inverse
Mills Ratio from the first stage and include it in the second stage to correct for the selfselection bias. This methodology has been used widely in the corporate diversification
literature.
Consistent with the diversification literature, we include both firm-level and industrylevel variables to model the propensity to diversify (e.g., Campa and Kedia (2002) and
Villalonga (2004)). Specifically, we use firm size measured as the logarithm of firm net sales
(FIRMSIZE), firm profitability measured as the earnings before interest and taxes divided by
net sales (EBIT), firm investment in capital expenditure measured as the capital expenditures
divided by net sales (CAPX), firm investment in research and development measured as the
research and development expenditure divided by net sales (RDI), an indicator variable that
equals one for firms listed on a major exchange (MAJOREX), an indicator variable that equals
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one if the firm is incorporated outside the U.S. (FOREIGN), an indicator variable that equals
one for firms that belong to the S&P index (SPDUMMY), an indicator variable for firms that
pay dividends (DIVIDUM), the logarithm of the number of years listed on CRSP (LNAGE),
the fraction of firms in the industry that are diversified (PCTDIV), and the fraction of industry
sales accounted by diversified firms (PCTSALEDIV), the GDP growth in the prior year
(GDPG), the number of months of recession in the prior year (CONT), the number of mergers
and acquisitions in the prior year as provided by SDC Platinum database (NMERG), and the
deal value of all the mergers and acquisitions as provided by SDC Platinum database
(DMERG). The estimated selection equation is reported below.
Prob(Multi - segment  1)  3.6  0.14 * FIRMSIZE  0.44 * EBIT  0.76 * CAPX  0.57 * RDI  0.07 * MAJOREX
 0.22 * FOREIGN  0.12 * SPDUMMY  0.03 * DIVIDUM  0.23 * LNAGE  3.1 * PCTDIV  0.08 * PCTSALEDIV
 0.01 * GDPG  0.004 * CONT  0.001 * NMERG  0.00001* DMERG

(7)

In the selection equation, we find that both firm and industry characteristics play an
important role in the decision of a firm to diversify into multiple segments. For example,
firms with larger size (FIRMSIZE), lower profitability (EBIT), lower investment in capital
expenditure (CAPX), and lower investment in research and development (RDI) are more
likely to be multi-segment. Firms with higher age (LNAGE), firms that pay dividends
(DIVIDUM), firms listed on major exchanges (MAJOREX), and firms that are part of the S&P
index (SPDUMMY) are more likely to be multi-segment. At the industry level, firms in
industries with larger percentage of diversified firms (PCTDIV), and in industries where
diversified firms account for larger percentage of sales (PCTSALEDIV) are more likely to be
multi-segment. Finally, the larger the number of mergers (NMERG), and the larger the GDP
growth in the prior year (GDPG), the more likely it is for the firms to be diversified. Our
results for the selection equation are generally consistent with the findings in Campa and
Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004).
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The results from the second stage of the Heckman methodology are reported in Table
VI. In Panel A, we report results based on vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum1 and
VrcForwDum1 which measure vertical relations across all segments of the firm. In Panel B,
we report results with vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum2 and VrcForwDum2 which
measure vertical relations between the primary segment and secondary segments of the firm.
We find that the coefficient on our measures for vertical relatedness (VrcBackDum1,
VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2) is positive and statistically significant at
conventional levels in all specifications. The interaction term between vertical relatedness and
diversity

in

investment

in

investment

opportunities

(VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY,

VrcForwDum1*DIVERSITY, VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY, VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY) is
negative and significant in most specifications. Diversity in investment opportunities
(DIVERSITY) is found to be negatively related to the efficiency of internal capital markets.
However, the relation is statistically insignificant in most specifications. The coefficient on
the sales based Herfindahl Index of the firm (HERFSAL) is positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level in all specifications indicating that focus improves allocative
efficiency. Finally, the Inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS) is significant in two of six
specifications reported in Panel A and in four of six specifications in Panel B. This indicates
that the self-selection bias is a relevant econometric issue in some of these regressions and
needs to be controlled for by modeling the propensity to diversify in the first stage.
In summary, in this section, we find that the firm/industry characteristics can explain
the decision of firms to diversify. Even after controlling for the selection bias that arises due
to this situation, we find that an increase in the degree of vertical relatedness between
segments improves the efficiency of the internal capital market allocations. Diversity in
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investment opportunities generally reduces this beneficial effect of vertical relatedness on
internal capital markets.
4.6. 2SLS Estimation
In this section, we tackle the potential endogeneity between vertical relatedness and
efficiency of internal capital market allocations by using 2SLS estimation. The endogeneity
can arise if, for example, some omitted variable like manager skill leads to higher vertical
relatedness between segments as well as a higher efficiency in internal capital market
allocations. To address this endogeneity, we first identify instruments that are related to the
degree of vertical relatedness between business segments of the firm but that are potentially
uncorrelated with the efficiency of internal capital market allocations.
In Section 3.1, we identified industry level variables that are motivated by economic
theory to explain the extent of vertical relatedness between segments. Since these variables
are measured at the industry level they are unlikely to impact the firm-level efficiency of
internal capital market allocations. We also showed that these variables are significant
determinants vertical relatedness between segments. Based on the above, we use the industry
level variables INDRDI, SAJVINT, INDADV, INDSELL, and INDHERF as prospective
instruments for the degree of vertical relatedness.
The results for the second stage of the 2SLS estimation and all tests pertaining to
endogeneity and instrumental variable validity are reported in Table VII. All estimation
models involve an interaction between the endogenous variable, our measure of inter-segment
vertical relatedness (VrcBackDum1, VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2), and
diversity in investment opportunities (DIVERSITY). As instruments for the interaction term,
we use the interaction between our instruments for vertical relatedness and the diversity
investment opportunities (e.g., Wooldridge (2002)). In the first stage, we include all control
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variables from the second stage along with instruments including those for the interaction
term. Due to space constraints, we do not report the first stage estimation results.
In Panel A, we report results based on vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum1
and VrcForwDum1 which measure vertical relations across all segments of the firm. In Panel
B, we report results with vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum2 and VrcForwDum2
which measure vertical relatedness between the primary segment and all secondary segments
of the firm.
In all specifications, the C statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the endogenous
variables are jointly exogenous to the efficiency of internal capital market allocations. This
adds validity to the usage of 2SLS estimation. Further, the Hansen J is statistically
insignificant for all specifications. We, therefore, cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
chosen instruments are valid. Finally, the Anderson-Rubin statistic is significant in all
specifications indicating that the coefficients on the endogenous regressors are jointly
significant in the second stage.
In both Panels A and B, we find that our measures for vertical relatedness
(VrcBackDum1, VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2) are positively related to
the efficiency of internal capital market allocations at conventional levels of significance in all
specifications. Diversity in investment opportunities (DIVERSITY) and the interaction term
between

vertical

relatedness

(VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY,

and

diversity

in

VrcForwDum1*DIVERSITY,

investment

opportunities

VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY,

VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY) are found to be statistically insignificant in most specifications.
Finally, we document a positive relationship between the sales-based Herfindahl Index of the
firm and the efficiency of internal capital market allocations in all specifications.
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Overall, using an instrumental variables approach, we show that vertical relatedness
between segments of multi-segment firms improves efficiency of internal capital market
allocations.36
4.7. Single Segment Firms that Choose to Diversify
As an additional test, we investigate the investment behavior for a sample of singlesegment firms that choose to diversify. In particular, we pay attention to single-segment firms
that choose to diversify into a vertically related industry. We denote the segment under the
single-segment structure as “existing” segment. The newly added segment could share
product market relations with the existing segment (such as vertical or horizontal) or could be
unrelated to the existing segment. We then compare the sensitivity of investment to
investment opportunities for the “existing” segment when it operated under the multi-segment
structure versus that under the single-segment structure.
We have argued earlier that vertical integration solves the underinvestment problem
and provides flexibility to undertake investments. If so, the existing segment should be able to
better respond to investment opportunities under the integrated structure. Accordingly, we
hypothesize that in the vertically related expansions there will be an increase in the sensitivity
of investment to investment opportunities. To test this hypothesis, we identify all firms that
report an increase in the number of segments during 1984 to 2005. We treat the year a firm
increased the number of segments as t=0, the two years under the multi-segment structure as
t=+1 and t=+2, and the two years under the single-segment structure as t=-1 and t=-2. We
create a dummy AFTER which equals 1 for t=+1 and t=+2 and equals 0 for t=-1 and t=-2. We
36

We perform the following robustness tests. First, we run the OLS, Heckman, and 2SLS estimations of (4), (5),
and (6) without the interaction term between the vertical relatedness dummy and DIVERSITY. We find that the
vertical dummy is significantly positive in all 2SLS models and for most of the OLS/Heckman models. Second,
we use continuous variables of vertical relatedness (VrcBackCoeff1, VrcForwCoeff1, VrcBackCoeff2, and
VrcForwCoeff2) instead of dummy variables. We find that the positive relation between vertical relatedness and
ICM efficiency still persists in all the OLS estimations, and for most of the Heckman/2SLS specifications.
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then pool the „before‟ and „after‟ observations for the segment under the single-segment
structure.
The extant literature has used the investment-q sensitivity as a measure for the
efficiency of ICMs (e.g., Scharfstein (1998) and Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002)).
Based on this literature, we propose the regression specification given by Equation (8) to
compare the investment-q sensitivity under the single-segment vs. vertically integrated
structures. In the model, CAPX is the ratio of segment capital expenditure to sales of the
existing segment, MEDTOBQ is the proxy for investment opportunities of the segment and
measured as the median Tobin‟s q for single-segment firms matched on the narrowest SIC
industry (four digit, three digit, or two digit SIC) with at least five single-segment firms,
AFTER is a dummy variable which equals one for observations that belong to t=+1 and t=+2,
and zero for observations of t=-1 and t=-2, VERT is a dummy variable that equals one if the
newly added segment shares a vertical relatedness of 5% level or greater with the existing
segment under single-segment structure, and equals zero if not, HOR is a dummy variable that
equals one if the four-digit SIC code of the existing segment equals the four-digit SIC code of
the newly added segment and zero otherwise. Consistent with Gertner, Powers, and
Scharfstein (2002), we include the segment operating profit scaled by segment sales (OPSS)
as a control variable in the regression.
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋 = 𝛿 + 𝛿1 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄 + 𝛿2 ∗ 𝑂𝑃𝑆𝑆 + 𝛿3 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅 + 𝛿4 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄 ∗
𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇 + 𝛿5 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐻𝑂𝑅

(8)

In the above specification, the coefficient on  3 provides the change in the sensitivity
of segment investment to investment opportunities from before to after for the addition of an
unrelated new segment. If expanding into a vertically related industry provides better
investment incentives in relation to the unrelated expansions, then we expect  4 to be positive.
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We find 286 cases of single-segment firm-years that diversify into two segments the
following year during the period 1984 to 2005. We find that in 85 of these expansions the
newly added segment is vertically related to the existing segment based on vertical relatedness
coefficient of 5% or more. We provide the results based for the OLS estimation of equation
(8) in Table VIII. We find that there is a decrease in the sensitivity of investment to
investment opportunities for the existing segment which does not share product market
relations with the newly added segment (  3 is negative). We find that the coefficient on  4 is
positive and statistically significant. This indicates that in the vertically related expansions,
the segment investment is more responsive to investment opportunities than in the unrelated
expansions. Moreover, the sum of  3 and  4 is positive, indicating that in the vertically
related expansions there is an increase in the investment-q sensitivity. These findings are
consistent with our hypothesis. To investigate whether the 1998 change in the segment
reporting standards (SFAS No. 131) accounts for our findings, we create a dummy PRE1998
which equals one for observations prior to 1998 and zero otherwise. We then interact this
variable with AFTER*MEDTOBQ*VERT. In model 2, we find that this interaction term is
statistically insignificant indicating that the improvement in sensitivity of investment to
investment opportunities for vertical expansions is not driven by the change in reporting
standards.37
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we use the benchmark input-output accounts of the U.S. economy and
measure vertical relatedness between business segments for firms operating in the United
States. The paper attempts to shed light on two issues, (i) The determinants of vertical

37

As a robustness test, we use the sum of segment capital and R&D expenditures divided by segment sales as
our dependent variable. We obtain qualitatively similar results under this approach.
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relatedness between segments of multi-segment firms on Compustat database, and (ii) How
inter-segment vertical relatedness affects efficiency of internal capital markets. We measure
vertical relatedness in a variety of ways. First, we exploit the benchmark input-output data to
compute backward and forward vertical relatedness for the firm. Second, we use different
measures to capture (i) the extent of vertical relatedness between all segments of the firm, and
(ii) the extent to which the secondary segments are vertically related to the primary segment
of the firm. Our sample comprises of 32,554 multi-segment firm-years covered by Compustat
database during the period 1984-2005.
Researchers have argued that vertical integration arises in response to costly
contracting (e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979)). We should
therefore observe a high degree of vertical relatedness between segments in industries likely
to involve relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts. Consistent with our
hypothesis, we find a higher degree of inter-segment vertical relatedness when the R&D
intensity of the primary industry is higher, and when strategic alliances and joint ventures
between firms in the primary industry and all vertically related supplier/customer industries
are more prevalent. We also find that inter-segment vertical relatedness is not motivated by
the anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration such as foreclosure or collusion. In this
regard, our evidence is consistent with the mergers literature which finds that vertical mergers
are efficiency enhancing and are not motivated to enhance market power (e.g., Eckbo (1983)
and Shenoy (2008)).
We then investigate how vertical relatedness between business segments affects the
working of internal capital markets. Although a large body of empirical research addresses
whether internal capital markets are efficient in allocating funds, very few studies investigate
how the presence of product market relations between segments affects the working of
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internal capital markets. In this regard, Stein (1997)‟s „winner-picking‟ hypothesis suggests
that firms operating in related lines of businesses are able to do a better job in the internal
allocation of corporate resources across divisions. We test this hypothesis by studying the
capital allocation made by the universe of all vertically integrated firms and single-segment
firms that choose to vertically integrate. Consistent with Stein (1997), we find that in firms
that exhibit significant inter-segment vertical relatedness, the investment flows towards
segments with better investment opportunities.
We make the following contributions to the extant literature. First, we provide the first
examination of determinants of the vertical boundaries for Compustat firms. Our analysis
builds upon Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006)‟s study on the determinants of partial equity
stakes and Acemoglu et al. (2009)‟s analysis on the cross-country variation in vertical
integration. Second, we add to the bright side view of internal capital markets by showing that
diversifying into vertically related industries facilitates the functioning of internal capital
markets. Our evidence is consistent with the findings in Khanna and Tice (2001) that related
diversifiers exhibit efficient internal capital allocations.
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Table I
Summary Statistics for the Sample of Multi-segment and Single Segment firms
This table provides the descriptive statistics of all multi-segment and single segments firms for the sample period 1984-2005. NUMSEG is the number of business
segments as reported on Compustat, ASSETS is the book value of firm assets in million dollars (Compustat Data6), SALES is the net sales in million dollars
(Compustat Data12), EBIT is the Earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat Data13 minus Data14) divided by net sales, CAPX is the Capital Expenditures
(Compustat Data128) divided by net sales, RDI is the research and development expenditure (Compustat Data 46) divided by net sales, MAJOREX is an indicator
variable that equals 1 for firms listed on a major exchange, FOREIGN is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is incorporated outside the U.S., SPDUMMY is
an indicator variable that equals 1 for firms that belong to the S&P index, DIVIDUM is an indicator variable for firms that pay dividends, LNAGE is the logarithm of
the firm age measured as the number of years listed on CRSP, PCTDIV is the fraction of firms that are diversified in the industry, and PCTSALEDIV is the fraction of
industry sales accounted by diversified firms. VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1) is the segment sales weighted backward (forward) vertical relatedness coefficient
between all segments of the firm and is based on the methodology developed by Acemoglu et al. (2009). VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) is the segment sales
weighted backward (forward) vertical relatedness between the primary segment of the firm and all its secondary segments and is computed based on the
methodology in Fan and Lang (2000). INDRDI is the R&D expenditure (Compustat Data46) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the
firm. INDADV is the advertising expenditure (Compustat Data45) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDSELL is the
selling, general, and administrative expenditure (Compustat Data189) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDHERF is the
sales based Herfindahl Index of the primary industry of the firm. SAJVINT is the number of strategic alliances/joint ventures between firms in the primary industry of
the firm and all vertically related industries at the 1% level as obtained from the SDC Platinum database divided by the number of firms in the primary industry.
PRIMSEGMKTSH is the market share of the primary segment in its industry, and SECSEGMKTSH is the segment sales weighted market share of all secondary
segments in their respective industries. CORESIZE is the proportion of total firm sales accounted by the primary segment of the firm, DIVERSITY is the diversity in
investment opportunities as measured in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), and HERFSAL is the Herfindahl Index of the firm based on its segment sales.
Panel A: Characteristics of multi-segment and single-segment firms in sample
Multi-Segment Firms
Lower
N
Mean
Median
Quartile
NUMSEG
32,554
2.936
3.000
2.000
ASSETS ($m.)
32,554
2417.2
447.3
109.0
SALES ($ m.)
32,554
2054.3
446.0
115.4
EBIT
32,502
0.061
0.071
0.026
CAPX
32,554
0.081
0.043
0.023
RDI
32,554
0.022
0.000
0.000
MAJOREX
32,554
0.767
1.000
1.000
FOREIGN
32,554
0.131
0.000
0.000
SPDUMMY
32,554
0.105
0.000
0.000
PCTDIV
32,554
0.693
0.710
0.579

Upper
Quartile
3.000
1971.0
1764.6
0.121
0.085
0.022
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.825

N
64,045
64,019
64,045
63,808
64,045
64,018
64,045
64,045
64,045
64,045

Mean
1.000
944.94
795.62
0.054
0.096
0.034
0.700
0.089
0.047
0.444

Single-Segment Firms
Lower
Median
Quartile
1.000
1.000
140.12
48.90
146.62
53.64
0.069
0.018
0.043
0.019
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.464
0.250

Upper
Quartile
1.000
482.86
486.79
0.134
0.097
0.036
1.000
0.000
0.000
0.636

- 104 -

PCTSALEDIV
DIVIDUM
LNAGE

32,554
32,554
32,554

0.720
0.489
2.52

0.767
0.000
2.64

0.598
0.000
1.79

0.893
1.000
3.30

64,045
64,045
64,045

0.467
0.306
1.950

0.485
0.000
1.946

0.181
0.000
1.099

0.727
1.000
2.708

Panel B: Vertical relatedness and industry/firm characteristics for multi-segment firms

VrcBackCoeff1
VrcForwCoeff1
VrcBackCoeff2
VrcForwCoeff2
INDRDI
INDADV
INDSELL
INDHERF
SAJVINT
PRIMSEGMKTSH
SECSEGMKTSH
CORESIZE
DIVERSITY
HERFSAL

N
32,552
32,552
32,397
32,397
32,384
32,384
32,384
32,384
32,554
32,410
32,506
32,554
32,550
32,554

Mean
2.81%
2.15%
1.26%
1.36%
0.024
0.011
0.182
0.193
0.241
0.066
0.0094
0.660
0.302
0.560

Median
0.23%
0.14%
0.11%
0.07%
0.002
0.003
0.170
0.161
0.058
0.016
0.0011
0.657
0.269
0.534

Lower
Quartile
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.00%
0.000
0.000
0.091
0.090
0.00
0.0033
0.0001
0.520
0.159
0.412

Upper
Quartile
1.92%
1.33%
0.95%
0.71%
0.022
0.015
0.248
0.260
0.308
0.071
0.007
0.812
0.425
0.690
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Table II
Determinants of Vertical Relatedness between all Business Segments of Multi-Segment
Firms
This table provides results for probit regressions of the determinants of vertical relatedness between
business segments of multi-segment firms. The dependent variable VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1)
is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff1
(VrcForwCoeff1), based on Acemoglu et al. (2009) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. The sample period
is 1984-2005. INDRDI is the R&D expenditure (Compustat Data 46) scaled by net sales (Compustat
Data 12) for the primary industry of the firm. SAJVINT is the intensity of strategic alliances/joint
ventures between the primary industry of the firm and all vertically related at the 1% level as
obtained from the SDC Platinum database. INDADV is the advertising expenditure (Compustat
Data45) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data 12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDSELL is
the selling, general, and administrative expenditure (Compustat Data 189) scaled by net sales
(Compustat Data 12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDHERF is the sales based Herfindahl
Index of the primary industry of the firm. PRIMSEGMKTSH is the market share of the primary
segment in its industry, and SECSEGMKTSH is the segment sales weighted market share of all
secondary segments in their respective industries. FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of firm net sales.
SALGROWTH is the one-year sales growth of the primary industry of the firm. All variables are
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. All specifications contain calendar year dummies. pvalues reported in the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are
clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively.
VrcBackDum1

INDRDI
SAJVINT
INDADV
INDSELL
INDHERF
PRIMSEGMKTSH
SECSEGMKTSH

VrcForwDum1

2.813***
(<0.01)
0.234***
(<0.01)
2.3963
(0.11)
-2.0855***
(<0.01)
0.1482
(0.29)
-1.2483***
(<0.01)
-0.0279
(0.98)

1.7697**
(0.02)
0.2416***
(<0.01)
1.5015
(0.33)
-1.7057***
(<0.01)
0.0709
(0.66)
-0.9323***
(<0.01)
0.7983
(0.28)

0.1836***
(<0.01)
-1.7504***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,333
401.3
<0.01
0.084

0.1560***
(<0.01)
-2.0813***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,333
339.6
<0.01
0.0719

SAJVINT*SALGROWTH
INDRDI*SALGROWTH
FIRMSIZE
Constant
Calendar year dummies
Observations
Chi-Squared
P Value
Pseudo RSquared

VrcBackDum1

VrcForwDum1

2.4839***
(<0.01)
0.2340***
(<0.01)
2.366
(0.11)
-2.0669***
(<0.01)
0.1471
(0.30)
-1.2532***
(<0.01)
-0.0597
(0.95)
0.0079
(0.31)
1.6444***
(<0.01)
0.1841***
(<0.01)
-1.7441***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,326
411.6
<0.01
0.0845

1.6105**
(0.03)
0.2381***
(<0.01)
1.4413
(0.35)
-1.6877***
(<0.01)
0.0553
(0.73)
-0.9391***
(<0.01)
0.7741
(0.30)
0.0227**
(0.03)
0.7399
(0.28)
0.1561***
(<0.01)
-2.0708***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,326
351.4
<0.01
0.0724
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Table III
Determinants of Vertical Relatedness between the Primary Segment and all Secondary
Segments of Multi-Segment Firms
This table provides results for probit regressions of the determinants of vertical relatedness between
the primary segment and all secondary segments of multi-segment firms. The dependent variable
VrcBackDum2 (VrcForwDum2) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward)
vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2), based on Fan and Lang (2000) exceeds 5%
and 0 otherwise. The sample period is 1984-2005. INDRDI is the R&D expenditure (Compustat
Data46) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the firm. SAJVINT is the
intensity of strategic alliances/joint ventures between the primary industry of the firm and all
vertically related at the 1% level as obtained from the SDC Platinum database. INDADV is the
advertising expenditure (Compustat Data45) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary
industry of the firm. INDSELL is the selling, general, and administrative expenditure (Compustat
Data189) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDHERF is
the sales based Herfindahl Index of the primary industry of the firm. PRIMSEGMKTSH is the market
share of the primary segment in its industry, and SECSEGMKTSH is the segment sales weighted
market share of all secondary segments in their respective industries. FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of
firm net sales. SALGROWTH is the one-year sales growth of the primary industry of the firm. All
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. All specifications contain calendar year
dummies. p-values reported in the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors
and are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1
respectively.

INDRDI
SAJVINT
INDADV
INDSELL
INDHERF
PRIMSEGMKTSH
SECSEGMKTSH

VrcBackDum2

VrcForwDum2

VrcBackDum2

VrcForwDum2

1.6982*
(0.06)
0.2625***
(<0.01)
0.7953
(0.67)
-2.031***
(<0.01)
-0.078
(0.68)
-2.609***
(<0.01)
-1.7605
(0.15)

1.5506*
(0.08)
0.213***
(<0.01)
3.258*
(0.07)
-2.4664***
(<0.01)
-0.1703
(0.35)
-2.437***
(<0.01)
-0.7577
(0.51)

0.188***
(<0.01)
-1.9924***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,178
307.1
0.104

0.1575***
(<0.01)
-2.0112***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,178
279
0.094

1.633**
(0.03)
0.2608***
(<0.01)
1.3205
(0.73)
-2.1832***
(<0.01)
-0.0846
(0.45)
-2.5799***
(<0.01)
-1.7558
(0.15)
0.0189*
(0.07)
2.3018***
(<0.01)
0.1872***
(<0.01)
-1.9634***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,171
341
0.105

1.7522**
(0.02)
0.2098***
(<0.01)
3.778**
(0.03)
-2.6351***
(<0.01)
-0.1806
(0.31)
-2.4043***
(<0.01)
-0.7429
(0.52)
0.0174
(0.11)
1.148
(0.13)
0.1562***
(<0.01)
-1.983***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,171
295
0.0947

SAJVINT*SALGROWTH
INDRDI*SALGROWTH
FIRMSIZE
Constant
Calendar year dummies
Observations
Chi-Squared
Pseudo RSquared
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Table IV
Univariate Results for the Measures of Internal Capital Market Efficiency by Vertical
Relatedness
This table provides gives the univariate results on the internal capital market efficiency measures. The sample period
is 1984-2005 and the sample includes all multi-segment firms on Compustat. RVA is the Relative Value Added by
Allocation developed by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), IQSENS is the Investment to Q sensitivity developed
by Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), and RINV is the Relative Investment Ratio developed by Rajan, Servaes, and
Zingales (2000). VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1) is the sales weighted backward (forward) vertical relatedness
between all segments of the firm and is based on the methodology proposed in Acemoglu et al. (2009).
VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) is the sales weighted backward (forward) vertical relatedness between the primary
segment and all secondary segments of the firm and is based on the methodology proposed in Fan and Lang (2000).
All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. Panel A provides the univariate results of efficiency
measures for the overall sample of multi-segment firms. Panel B provides the sub-sample analysis based on the
backward vertical coefficients (VrcBackCoeff1, VrcBackCoeff2) and Panel C provides sub-sample analysis based
on the forward vertical coefficient (VrcForwCoeff1, VrcForwCoeff2). In each panel, cutoffs of 5% and 1% are used
for VRCATINP and VRCATOUT. Efficiency measures are reported for the firms above the cutoff and below the
cutoff. DiffMean is the t-statistic for the difference in means between the below and above cutoff samples. ***, **,
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively.
Lower
Upper
Efficiency Measures
N
Mean
Quartile
Quartile
RVA
32,552
-0.00005
-0.00089
0.00057
IQSENS
32,552
0.00024
-0.00029
0.00048
RINV
32,472
-0.00013
-0.0065
0.00485
Panel B-Backward Vertical Relatedness
VrcBackCoeff1<0.05
VrcBackCoeff1>=0.05
N
Mean
N
Mean
DiffMean
RVA
28,097
-0.00008**
4,455
0.00012*
-2.20**
IQSENS
28,097
0.00022***
4,455
0.00035***
-1.83**
RINV
28,023
-0.00025*
4,449
0.00058*
-2.16**

RVA
IQSENS
RINV

VrcBackCoeff2<0.05
VrcBackCoeff2>=0.05
N
Mean
N
Mean
30,180
-0.00008**
2,220
0.00034***
30,180
0.00022***
2,220
0.00048***
30,104
-0.00022*
2,216
0.001*
Panel C-Forward Vertical Relatedness
VrcForwCoeff1<0.05
VrcForwCoeff1>=0.05
N
Mean
N
Mean
29,008
-0.00009***
3,544
0.00027**
29,008
0.00021***
3,544
0.00048***
28,934
-0.00025*
3,538
0.00081*

RVA
IQSENS
RINV

VrcForwCoeff2<0.05
N
Mean
30,105
-0.0001***
30,105
0.00021***
30,028
-0.00029**

RVA
IQSENS
RINV

VrcForwCoeff2>=0.05
N
Mean
2,295
0.00051**
2,295
0.00056***
2,292
0.0018***

DiffMean
-3.33***
-2.47**
-2.36**

DiffMean
-3.54***
-3.21***
-2.51**

DiffMean
-4.92***
-3.37***
-4.06***
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Table V
OLS Regressions of Internal Capital Market Efficiency Measures on Vertical Relatedness
The sample includes all multi-segments on Compustat from 1984-2005. The dependent variable is the measure
for internal capital market efficiency (RVA, IQSENS, or RINV). FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of firm net sales.
DIVERSITY is the diversity in investment opportunities is measured as the standard deviation of the asset
weighted segment q‟s. HERFSAL is the sales based Herfindahl index across the business segments of the firm.
VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical
relatedness, VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1), based on Acemoglu et al. (2009) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise.
VrcBackDum2 (VrcForwDum2) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical
relatedness, VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2), based on Fan and Lang (2000) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. All
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. Panel A (Panel B) provides regressions based on asset
(sales) weighted vertical relatedness coefficients. All specifications contain calendar year dummies. p-values
reported in the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are clustered by firm. The
symbols ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively.

Panel A
VrcBackDum1
VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0006**

0.0004*

0.0027***

(0.02)

(0.07)

(0.01)

-0.0013**

-0.0008

-0.0062**

(0.03)

(0.14)

(0.02)

VrcForwDum1
VrcForwDum1*DIVERSITY
FIRMSIZE
DIVERSITY

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0008***

0.0005**

(<0.01)

(0.02)

(0.06)

-0.0016**

-0.0008

-0.0038

0.0022*

(0.04)

(0.21)

(0.28)

0.000

0.000

0.0001

0.000

0.000

0.0001

(0.12)

(0.77)

(0.57)

(0.15)

(0.86)

(0.52)

-0.0006

-0.0006*

-0.0014

-0.0006

-0.0006*

-0.0017

(0.14)

(0.08)

(0.34)

(0.13)

(0.07)

(0.26)

0.0015***

0.0009***

0.0047***

0.0015***

0.0009***

0.0046***

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

-0.0016***

-0.0003

-0.0039***

-0.0016***

-0.0003

-0.0038***

(<0.01)

(0.57)

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

(0.59)

(<0.01)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

32,548

32,548

32,468

32,548

32,548

32,468

RSquared

0.00367

0.00193

0.00223

0.00396

0.00218

0.00212

F Val

3.52

1.785

1.906

3.626

1.97

1.866

Panel B

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0010***
(<0.01)

0.0006**
(0.03)

0.0041**
(0.01)

-0.0022***
(<0.01)

-0.0012*
(0.07)

-0.0097**
(0.01)

VrcForwDum2

0.0012***
(<0.01)

0.0007**
(0.02)

0.0049***
(<0.01)

VrcForwDum2* DIVERSITY

-0.0024***
(<0.01)

-0.0013*
(0.07)

-0.0101**
(0.02)

HERFSAL
Constant
Calendar year dummies

VrcBackDum2

VrcBackDum2* DIVERSITY
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FIRMSIZE
DIVERSITY
HERFSAL
Constant

Calendar year dummies

0.0000*

0.000

0.0001

0.000

0.000

0.0001

(0.08)

(0.64)

(0.40)

(0.11)

(0.71)

(0.49)

-0.0005

-0.0005

-0.0012

-0.0005

-0.0005

-0.0011

(0.19)

(0.11)

(0.41)

(0.22)

(0.12)

(0.45)

0.0014***

0.0008**

0.0043***

0.0013***

0.0008**

0.0041***

(<0.01)

(0.01)

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

(0.01)

(0.01)

-0.0016***

-0.0003

-0.0039***

-0.0016***

-0.0003

-0.0037***

(<0.01)

-0.57

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

(0.60)

(<0.01)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Observations

32,396

32,396

32,316

32,396

32,396

32,316

RSquared

0.0039

0.00196

0.00226

0.00425

0.00213

0.00255

F Val

3.665

1.821

1.888

3.707

1.941

1.969
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Table VI
Heckman Regressions of Internal Capital Market Efficiency Measures on Vertical Relatedness
The sample includes all multi-segments on Compustat from 1984-2005. The dependent variable is the measure for
internal capital market efficiency (RVA, IQSENS, or RINV). FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of firm net sales.
DIVERSITY is the diversity in investment opportunities is measured as the standard deviation of the asset weighted
segment q‟s. HERFSAL is the sales based Herfindahl index across the business segments of the firm.
VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness,
VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1), based on Acemoglu et al. (2009) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. VrcBackDum2
(VrcForwDum2) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff2
(VrcForwCoeff2), based on Fan and Lang (2000) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. INVMILLS is the Inverse Mills
Ratio from the selection equation. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. Panel A (Panel B)
provides regressions based on asset (sales) weighted vertical relatedness coefficients. All specifications contain
calendar year dummies and reported p-values in the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard
errors and are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively.

Panel A
VrcBackDum1
VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0006**
(0.02)
-0.0013**
(0.03)

0.0004*
(0.07)
-0.0008
(0.14)

0.0028***
(0.01)
-0.0065**
(0.01)

VrcForwDum1
VrcForwDum1* DIVERSITY
FIRMSIZE
DIVERSITY
HERFSAL
Constant
Calendar year dummies
Total Observations
Censored Observations
INVMILLS
Chi-Square
R-squared
Panel B
VrcBackDum2
VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY

0.0001**
(0.02)
-0.0006
(0.11)
0.0014***
(<0.01)
-0.0012***
(<0.01)
Yes
96,033
63,627
0.0002**
95.31
.

0.000
(0.85)
-0.0006*
(0.08)
0.0009***
(<0.01)
0.0001
(0.57)
Yes
96,033
63,627
-0.00001
48.32
.

0.0001
(0.28)
-0.0016
(0.29)
0.0046***
(<0.01)
-0.0030**
(0.02)
Yes
96,033
63,707
0.0006
50.46
.

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0010***
(<0.01)
-0.0023***
(<0.01)

0.0006**
(0.03)
-0.0012*
(0.06)

0.0041**
(0.01)
-0.0101**
(0.01)

VrcForwDum2
VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY
FIRMSIZE

0.0001**
(0.01)

0.000
(0.7)

0.0002
(0.16)

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0008***
(0.01)
-0.0016**
(0.04)
0.0001**
(0.03)
-0.0006
(0.1)
0.0014***
(<0.01)
-0.0011***
(<0.01)
Yes
96,033
63,627
0.0002**
97.42
.

0.0005**
(0.02)
-0.0008
(0.22)
0.000
(0.97)
-0.0006*
(0.07)
0.0009***
(<0.01)
0.0002
(0.53)
Yes
96,033
63,627
0.00003
53.62
.

0.0023*
(0.06)
-0.0041
(0.24)
0.0001
(0.26)
-0.0018
(0.22)
0.0045***
(<0.01)
-0.0029**
(0.03)
Yes
96,033
63,707
0.0006
48.76
.

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0012***
(<0.01)
-0.0024***
(0.01)
0.0001**
(0.02)

0.0007**
(0.02)
-0.0013*
(0.07)
0.000
(0.77)

0.0050***
(<0.01)
-0.0106**
(0.02)
0.0001
(0.22)
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DIVERSITY
HERFSAL
Constant
Calendar year dummies
Observations
Censored Observations
INVMILLS
Chisqr
R-Squared

-0.0006
(0.15)
0.0013***
(<0.01)
-0.0012***
(<0.01)
Yes
95,879
63,627
0.0003**
99.48
-

-0.0005
(0.11)
0.0008***
(0.01)
0.0002
(0.56)
Yes
95,879
63,627
-0.000001
49.2
-

-0.0014
(0.34)
0.0042***
(0.01)
-0.0030**
(0.02)
Yes
95,879
63,707
0.00069*
50.23
-

-0.0005
(0.18)
0.0013***
(<0.01)
-0.0011***
(<0.01)
Yes
95,879
63,627
0.0003**
100.3
-

-0.0005
(0.12)
0.0008**
(0.01)
0.0002
(0.52)
Yes
95,879
63,627
-0.000001
52.62
-

-0.0013
(0.38)
0.0041***
(0.01)
-0.0029**
(0.03)
Yes
95,879
63,707
0.00066*
51.94
-
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Table VII
2SLS Regressions of Internal Capital Market Efficiency Measures on Vertical Relatedness
The table reports the results for the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. The sample period is 1984-2005.
The dependent variable is the measure for internal capital market efficiency (RVA, IQSENS, or RINV).
FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of firm net sales. DIVERSITY is the diversity in investment opportunities is
measured as the standard deviation of the asset weighted segment q‟s. HERFSAL is the sales based
Herfindahl index across the business segments of the firm. VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) is a dummy that
equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1), based
on Acemoglu et al. (2009) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. VrcBackDum2 (VrcForwDum2) is a dummy that
equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2), based
on Fan and Lang (2000) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile
level. Panel A (Panel B) provides regressions based on asset (sales) weighted vertical relatedness
coefficients. The Hansen J statistic tests the overidentifying restrictions with the joint null hypothesis that all
instruments are valid. The Anderson Rubin statistic tests the joint significance of the endogenous regressors
in the second stage with the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. The C statistic tests the exogeneity
of endogenous regressors under the null that the endogeneous regressors can be treated as exogenous. All
specifications contain calendar year dummies and p-values reported in the parentheses are based on
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote
p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively.

VARIABLES
VrcBackDum1
VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY

RVA
0.002***
(<0.01)
-0.0025
(0.16)

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0009*
(0.09)
-0.0003
(0.82)

0.0061**
(0.03)
-0.0051
(0.49)

VrcForwDum1
VrcForwDum1* DIVERSITY
FIRMSIZE
DIVERSITY
HERFSAL
Constant
Calendar year dummies
Observations
Hansen J
Hansen J (P value)
Anderson Rubin
Anderson Rubin (P Value)
C Stat
C Stat (P Value)
R-squared
VARIABLES
VrcBackDum2

0.000
(0.85)
-0.0005
(0.21)
0.0016***
(<0.01)
-0.0010***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,379
3.59
(0.17)
16.67***
(<0.01)
10.04***
(<0.01)
-

0.000
(0.61)
-0.0006*
(0.07)
0.0010***
(<0.01)
0.0001
(0.73)
Yes
32,185
10.37
(0.11)
19.2**
(0.01)
7.72**
(0.02)
-

-0.0001
(0.65)
-0.0018
(0.26)
0.0054***
(<0.01)
-0.0028**
(0.03)
Yes
32,105
4.03
(0.26)
15.82***
(<0.01)
10.05***
(<0.01)
-

RVA
0.0029***
(<0.01)

IQSENS
0.0011*
(0.09)

RINVFIRM
0.0082**
(0.03)

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM

0.0021***
(0.01)
-0.0025
(0.24)
0.000
(0.69)
-0.0005
(0.19)
0.0016***
(<0.01)
-0.0010***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,379
3.25
(0.20)
16.67***
(<0.01)
8.61**
(0.01)
-

0.0010*
(0.09)
-0.0005
(0.79)
0.000
(0.75)
-0.0006*
(0.08)
0.0010***
(<0.01)
0.0001
(0.64)
Yes
32,170
12.70
(0.12)
22.5**
(0.01)
5.40*
(0.07)
-

0.0064**
(0.05)
-0.0037
(0.67)
0.000
(0.81)
-0.0019
(0.24)
0.0054***
(<0.01)
-0.0025**
(0.04)
Yes
32,105
3.65
(0.30)
15.82***
(<0.01)
8.80**
(0.01)
-

RVA

IQSENS

RINVFIRM
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VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY

-0.0043*
(0.06)

-0.0005
(0.82)

-0.0077
(0.41)

VrcForwDum2
VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY
FIRMSIZE
DIVERSITY

HERFSAL
Constant
Calendar year dummies
Observations
Hansen J
Hansen J P Val
Anderson Rubin
Anderson Rubin P
C Stat
C Stat P Val
R-squared

0.00002
(0.46)
-0.0004
(0.39)

0.000
(0.82)
-0.0006*
(0.09)

0.000
(0.95)
-0.0013
(0.39)

0.0012***
(<0.01)
-0.0009***
(<0.01)
Yes
32,225
3.96
(0.14)
18.26***
(<0.01)
9.81***
(<0.01)
-

0.0008**
(0.02)
0.0002
(0.43)
Yes
32,225
13.55
(0.11)
20.83**
(0.01)
7.02**
(0.03)
-

0.0039**
(0.01)
-0.0021*
(0.09)
Yes
32,145
3.86
(0.15)
15.19***
(<0.01)
10.00***
(<0.01)
-

0.0028***
(<0.01)
-0.0041
(0.07)
0.000
(0.77)
-0.0003
(0.46)

0.0011*
(0.10)
-0.0003
(0.88)
0.000
(0.83)
-0.0006
(0.11)

0.0079**
(0.03)
-0.007
(0.46)
0.000
(0.99)
-0.0011
(0.47)

0.0012***
(<0.01)
-0.0008***
(0.01)
Yes
32,225
4.11
(0.13)
18.26***
(<0.01)
7.21**
(0.03)
-

0.0007**
(0.03)
0.0002
(0.34)
Yes
32,225
11.05
(0.14)
20.83**
(0.01)
5.96*
(0.05)
-

0.0037**
(0.02)
-0.0018
(0.14)
Yes
32,145
4.07
(0.13)
15.19***
(<0.01)
6.98**
(0.03)
-
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Table VIII
Sensitivity of Segment Investment to Investment Opportunities for Single-Segment
Firms that Choose to Diversify
This table contains the results for OLS regression models for the segment investment sensitivity to
Tobin‟s q for single-segment firms that started during the sample period of 1984 to 2005 as singlesegment firms but chose to diversify. The observations included are for the segment that appeared
in the single-segment regime as well as the multi-segment regime. Observations for t=-2 (two years
prior to the calendar year the firm became multi-segment), t=-1 (one year prior to the calendar year
the firm became multi-segment), t=+1 (one year after the calendar year the firm became multisegment), and t=+2 (two years after the calendar year the firm became multi-segment) have been
included in the analysis. The dependent variable CAPX which is the segment capital expenditure
divided by sales MEDTOBQ is the median Tobin‟s q of single segment firms matched on the fourdigit, three-digit, or two-digit SIC codes. OPSS is the segment operating income divided by
segment sales. AFTER is a dummy that is set to one for observations at t=+1 and t=+2 and zero
otherwise. VERT is a dummy that is set to one if the vertical relatedness coefficient between the
segment under the single-segment status and newly added segment is greater than or equal to 5%
and set to zero otherwise. HOR is a dummy that is set to one if the four digit SIC code of the old
segment equals that of the new segment and set to zero otherwise. PRE1998 is a dummy that equals
one for observations prior to 1998 and zero for observations in 1998 or later. p-values reported in
the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are clustered by firm.
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
Dependent Variable: CAPX

MEDTOBQ

OPSS

AFTER*MEDTOBQ

AFTER*MEDTOBQ*VERT

AFTER*MEDTOBQ*HOR

Model 1

Model 2

0.0111

0.0134

(0.45)

(0.37)

0.344***

0.349***

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

-0.0169***

-0.0164***

(<0.01)

(<0.01)

0.0304**

0.049*

(0.04)

(0.09)

0.0162

0.0125

(0.34)

(0.49)

AFTER*MEDTOBQ*VERT*PRE1998

-0.035
(0.25)

Constant

0.042**

0.038**

(0.03)

(0.05)

Observations

1,050

1,050

F Val

6.13***

5.37***

R-squared

0.11

0.11
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